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This study compares the implications of changing from the prior capital standards to the 
current capital standards on Farm Credit System associations.  The current capital standards 
effective as of January 1, 2017, were implemented to provide a higher level of safety and 
soundness. “Safety and soundness” refers to the ability to absorb risk and remain solvent.  The 
difference in alternative capital standards’ safety and soundness are compared by reverse stress 
testing to find the degree of stress needed to breach a minimum capital standard.  The reverse 
stress tests are done using the Association Planning Model (APM) to project pro forma financial 
statements and capital ratios.  The APM uses seven key risk factors including loan growth rate, 
three measures of credit quality, two measures of interest rate spreads, and percentage change in 
non-interest expense.  The key risk factors are all projected using a percentile of stress from each 
association’s unique history except for the interest rate spreads measures due to them being non-
stationary in their histories.  The APM methodology provides a standardized stress scenario 
across associations allowing for the relative capital adequacy of associations to be measured.  
The reverse stress tests conducted using the APM indicate that the current capital standards 
provide a slightly higher level of safety and soundness in general, but most association hold 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
The banking sector has been subjected to an increase in regulatory oversight since the 
housing crash of 2008.  While all sectors of the economy are subject to regulation, the banking 
sector is particularly critical and has direct government oversight.  The regulatory oversight is 
partially a function of the importance of the banking sector, and the implicit guarantee of the 
government with taxpayers being implicit shareholders. 
Post housing crisis, the banking sector’s regulators introduced new regulations to increase 
the safety and soundness of the banking system.  “Safety and soundness” refers to the ability to 
absorb risk and remain solvent.  It is often registered as the corresponding amount of capital 
needed to maintain some cushion over a minimum level of a measure of interest.  In this study, 
the emphasis is on regulatory minimum capital standards. 
Recent notable regulatory changes include the Dodd-Frank Act (DFA) and the adoption 
of Basel III standards for capital and liquidity.  Basel III requires banks to hold more capital in 
general, and the minimum varies more directly with differences in the riskiness of their activities.  
The DFA includes two stress tests emphasizing not just the amount of regulatory capital, but also 
the level of stress needed to fall below a minimum capital standard.  DFA stress tests estimate 
the impact of macroeconomic factors on regulatory capital ratios.  However, unless banks have 
identical portfolio compositions, these stress test will result in unequal safety and soundness 
measures across banks.  Thus, there is a need to have a stress test that can standardize the degree 
of stress across banks. 
The Farm Credit System (FCS) is a Government Sponsored Enterprise (GSE) comprised 
of a system of cooperative banks (System Banks) and lending associations charged with serving 
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agriculture and related interests.  As a GSE, the FCS benefits from an implicit government 
guarantee on the debt it issues to fund loans.  However, the FCS is regulated outside the 
commercial banking system.  The FCS’s cooperative structure makes the use of identical capital 
regulations to those of banks difficult (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2011).  
Notable differences include the fact that cooperative equity and allocated surplus treatment 
differs from traditional common equity under Basel III capital standards.  However, policy-
makers have shown a preference for separate yet similar regulation to that of the commercial 
banking sector, again, because taxpayers are potentially liable for future bailouts.  Thus, similar 
regulations tend to be promulgated by the Farm Credit Administration (FCA), the regulator of 
the FCS.  Additionally, due to the FCS’s GSE status and single sector credit risk exposure to 
agriculture, there is a need to show that their capital standards are at least as sound as the banks. 
  
1.1 Purpose and Contribution 
 
This research compares the implications of changing from the prior FCS capital 
regulations to current capital standards on FCS associations.  The two capital standards are 
compared by reverse stress testing to find the degree of stress needed to hit a critical point, such 
as a minimum capital ratio under both capital standards.  The reverse stress tests are done using 
the Association Planning Model (APM) to project pro forma financial statements and capital 
ratios.  This approach will help demonstrate differences in safety and soundness measures and 
guide regulators regarding the congruence between capital regulations and key risk factors.  
Furthermore, this study provides a stress testing framework that standardizes the degree 
of stress across associations by selecting a percentile of stress for key risk factors.  For example, 
instead of using a 2% as the nonaccrual stress rate across all institutions, the study uses a 
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constant percentile of stress for this key risk, thereby standardizing the likelihood of occurrence 
rather than choosing an arbitrary fixed level that would imply different likelihoods of solvency 
across different institutions.  The APM uses seven key risk factors to create pro forma financial 
statements.  The seven key risk factors are loan growth rate, three indicators of credit quality 
(allowance for loan losses, nonaccrual loans, and net charge-offs) as a percentage of gross loan 
items, two measures of interest rate spreads (cost of debt and average loan interest rate) and 
percentage change in non-interest expense.  The key risk factors are all projected using a 
percentile of stress from each association’s unique history except for the interest rate spreads 




This study is separated into seven chapters.  Chapter 2 covers background information on 
regulatory capital requirements, Federal Reserve stress testing, and the FCS’s history and current 
structure.  Chapter 3 provides a review of previous research on the impact of commercial 
banking sector regulations and stress testing methodologies.  Chapter 4 describes and 
demonstrates the functionality of the APM.  Chapter 5 describes the data set used in this study.  
Chapter 6 explains the results of the APM outlined in Chapter 4.  Lastly, Chapter 7 summarizes 




CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND 
 
 
 This chapter provides an overview of the FCS’s structure, regulatory capital ratios, and 
the Federal Reserve stress tests.  Studying the banking sector’s regulatory environment is crucial 
because the regulator of the FCS, the FCA, is influenced by banking sector regulations.  
However, the unique structure of the FCS causes differences in regulations between the FCS and 
the banking sector.  This chapter discusses the implications of these items. 
 
2.1 Summary of the Historical and Current Farm Credit System Structure 
 
The FCS’s structure has been shaped by the economic conditions of the U.S. agriculture 
economy, the U.S. economy, and Federal Reserve policy.  Significant historical events 
documented by the FCA are summarized below to highlight how the FCS’s current structure was 
created.  
The FCS is a Government Sponsored Enterprise (GSE) that was established in 1916.  
GSE status refers to a corporation created by Congress that is not a direct liability of the 
Government.  Originally, there were 12 Federal Land Banks (FLBs) with National Farm Loan 
Associations (NFLAs) that operated as branches, and the FCS could only make loans for land 
purchases.  Each FLB had a unique territory that they could lend to, known as a District; the 12 
FLBs combined covered all 50 states.  
Global competition caused a need for reliable short-term and intermediate-term credit for 
farmers shortly after the creation of the FCS.  The Agricultural Credit Act of 1923 established 
Federal Intermediate Credit Banks (FICBs) for each of the twelve Districts.  FICBs operated as 
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wholesale lenders to financial institutions providing credit to farmers for short-term and 
intermediate-term purposes.   
Contrary to expectations, financial institutions made minimal use of FICBs’ wholesale 
funding option.  Additionally, the FLBs’ loan portfolios had high default rates because of low 
commodity prices during this period.  These conditions led Congress to pass the Agricultural Act 
of 1933 revamping the structure of the FCS to address these issues.  After the Agricultural Act of 
1933, the FCS consisted of:  
• 12 FLBs with affiliated Federal Land Bank Associations (FLBAs) 
• 12 FICB with affiliated Production Credit Associations (PCAs)  
• 12 Bank of Cooperatives (BCs)  
• A Central Bank of Cooperatives 
PCAs received their funding from the FICB in the District in which they were located 
creating a path for FICB’s funding to reach farmers.  PCAs operated autonomously within the 
defined territory they were eligible to originate loans for short-term and intermediate-term 
purposes.  FLBAs replaced NFLAs and operated autonomously originating loans for long-term 
purposes.  The term "System Banks" will be used to refer to FLBs, FICBs, and any other FCS 
institution that provides wholesale funding to associations. 
The creation of BCs made available a new way of providing reliable credit to the 
agriculture sector.  The BC in each District provided financing to cooperatives.  The Central 
Bank of Cooperatives was created to purchase portions of BC’s loans, helping remove 
concentration risk of BCs, therefore, lowering BC’s need to hold excess capital. 
Additionally, in 1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt used his executive power to create 
the FCA to regulate all GSE agricultural credit institutions separately from commercial banks.  
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The FCA’s role is to make sure a dependable source of credit is available to rural and 
agricultural communities (Farm Credit Administration, 2014). 
In 1968, the FCS finished repaying the original capital provided by the Government to set 
up and establish operations.  Three years later, the Farm Credit Act of 1971 gave the FCS 
expanded lending authority that included providing credit to commercial fisherman and for rural 
home purchases.  This Act was amended in 1980 to encourage lending to young, beginning, and 
small farmers. 
After a period of high commodity prices and inflation in the 1970’s improving U.S. farm 
incomes and increasing land values, the 1980’s was a period of rising interest rates facilitated by 
Federal Reserve policy attempting to slow inflation.  The rising interest rates lowered farmland 
values and commodity prices.  These factors caused widespread loan defaults in the agriculture 
sector and caused many FCS institutions to struggle financially.   
One result of the Farm Credit crisis was the Farm Credit Amendments Act of 1985, 
providing the FCA more oversight authority and power.  Currently, FCA accomplishes its role in 
two ways; creating regulations that all System Banks, associations, and other Farm Credit 
institutions must adhere to, and conducting audit and reviews examinations to ensure safe and 
sound practices are followed (Farm Credit Administration, 2018).  FCA can require corrective 
actions to be taken when deficiencies are identified. 
The Agricultural Act of 1987 allowed Congress to provide the FCS financial assistance to 
survive the farm crisis and to restructure the FCS to the more efficient structure that exists today.  
This Act established the Farm Credit System Insurance Corporation (FCSIC) to ensure the 
timely payment of FCS bonds.  FCSIC accomplishes this by maintaining the Congressionally 
mandated secure base, currently defined as two percent of the System Bank’s outstanding debt 
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adjusted downward for the government guaranteed portions of loans (Farm Credit System 
Insurance Corporation, 2015). 
The first of the FCS structural changes was the mandatory merger of intra-District FLBs 
and FICBs into one entity known as a Farm Credit Bank (FCB) with the authority of both 
entities.  The BCs were given the opportunity to merge but were not required to merge.  A 
merged BC and FCB would have the power of both institutions and is known as Agricultural 
Credit Bank (ACB).  PCAs and FLBAs in the same territory could also merge but were not 
required to merge, although most did.  The resulting entity of such a merger is known as an 
Agricultural Credit Association (ACA) and has the authority to make loans for short, 
intermediate, and long-term purposes.  Farm Land Credit Associations (FLCAs) were also 
established to make loans for long-term purposes.  All associations are restricted to originating 
loans in their geographical area for the most part.  Associations can provide credit to a borrower 
outside their territory by purchasing loans from another lender or receiving permission to 
originate a loan from the association covering a geographical area in which a loan is originated. 
As of January 1, 2016, the FCS was comprised of one ACB, three FCBs, and 75 
associations with 73 ACAs and 2 FLCAs.  The FCA regulates all FCS entities.  Figure 2.1 
displays the headquarter of the four System Banks and the territory charter of the affiliated 
associations.  Figure 2.2 shows the consolidation of System Banks from 1983 to 2016.  System 
Banks consolidating is likely driven by economies of scales benefits from increased wholesale 
loan volume. 
 Figure 2.3 shows the consolidation of associations since 1983 and the resulting mix of 
association types.  The number of associations in the FCS has declined by more than 90% since 
1983.  The shrinking number of associations is an indicator of the importance of economies of 
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scale and portfolio diversification.  The current structure, which is almost exclusively ACAs, is 
likely also driven by economies of scope.  Chapter 5 provides a more detailed explanation of the 
factors causing consolidation. 
 
2.2   Summary of Basel III and Predecessors 
 
The FCS’s current capital standards are based mostly on constructs from the Basel 
Committee’s Basel III Accord.  The Basel Committee itself has no cited authority but historically 
has been implemented in similar form by financial system regulators.  The Basel accorded in 
1988 (Basel I) introduced risk weights for credit risk and started the transition to risk-weighted 
capital standards.  While this was a starting point, it encouraged banks to find ways to regulatory 
arbitrage by incentivizing the use of financial products that avoided risk weights, causing the 
risk-weighted capital ratios to incorrectly measure banks’ solvency risk (Chumo, 2011). 
Basel II was created to address the first Basel accord’s shortcomings.  Basel II has three 
pillars, targeting significant aspects of what is needed to have a safe and sound financial system.  
Pillar 1 addresses capital measures and standards, Pillar 2 focuses on regulatory oversight, and 
Pillar 3 covers market discipline. 
Pillar 1 defines risk-weighting methodologies to calculate the capital required to 
withstand credit risk, operational risk, and market risk.  Each category of risk has multiple 
methods to calculate the appropriate risk-weighting. 
There are three alternative approaches to calculate credit risk: the standardized approach, 
the internal ratings based (IRB) approach, and the advanced internal ratings based (A-IRB) 
approach.  The standardized approach’s risk-weights are based on the predefined risk associated 
with an asset category.  IRB uses some supervisory inputs but allows banks to calculate their 
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risk-weights based on their loans’ probabilities of defaulting and correlations to other loans 
defaulting.  A-IRB is similar to IRB, but banks are required to use their internal data to calculate 
all of the inputs to calculate risk-weights.  The FCS uses the standardized approach to calculate 
risk-weighted assets (RWA). 
Operational risk can also be calculated under three approaches: the basic indicator 
approach, the standardized approach, and the advanced measurement approach.  The resulting 
value is added to a bank’s RWA.  The basic indicator approach calculates a bank’s operational 
risk by multiplying a parameter defined by a bank’s regulator by gross revenue.  The 
standardized approach takes the basic indicator approach one step further by setting a parameter 
for each business line item that is multiplied by the corresponding business line item to calculate 
operational risk.  The advanced measurement approach requires banks to compute the 
operational risk of extremely low likelihood events. 
Banks have two methods to calculate their market risk.  The first method is termed the 
standard measurement method and the second method is termed the internal model approach.  
The resulting value is added to a bank’s RWA.  Similar to the standardized approach for credit 
risk, the standard measurement method calculates a bank’s market risk by multiplying a bank’s 
regulator defined parameters by each market risk item.  A bank using the internal model 
approach use their own internal model to calculate the value-at-risk over a ten-day period at a 
one-tail 99th percentile and multiply it by a regulator determined parameter (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, 2009). 
Pillar 2 encourages banks to monitor their risks and regulators to be proactive.  The four 
principles from Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001) are: 
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1) Banks should have a process for assessing their overall capital adequacy in relation to 
their risk profile and a strategy for maintaining their capital levels. 
2) Supervisors should review and evaluate banks’ internal capital adequacy assessments 
and strategies, as well as their ability to monitor and ensure their compliance with 
regulatory capital ratios. Supervisors should take appropriate supervisory action if they 
are not satisfied with the result of the process.  
3) Supervisors should expect banks to operate above the minimum regulatory capital 
ratios and should have the ability to require banks to hold capital in excess of the 
minimum. 
4) Supervisors should seek to intervene at an early stage to prevent capital from falling 
below the minimum levels required to support the risk characteristics of a particular 
bank and should require rapid remedial action if capital is not maintained or restored. 
 
Pillar 2 also allows regulators to adjust the minimum regulatory capital requirements if 
Pillar 1 does not capture all the relevant risks or incorrectly risk-weights.  Building upon Pillar 2, 
Pillar 3 focuses on providing transparency in the form of increased disclosures by banks.  The 
increased transparency allows market participants to assess more accurately the risk profile of 
each bank. 
Basel III attempts to address Basel II shortcomings that contributed to the most recent 
financial crisis such as funding risk and liquidity risk.  Additionally, Basel III introduced a non-
risk-weighted capital standard and increased risk-weighted capital requirements.  FCA has 
adopted the Basel III capital standards and is studying if they should also incorporate the Basel 
III liquidity risk and funding risk standards (Farm Credit Administration , 2017). 
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The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision released Basel III in 2011, the third of the 
Basel installments, with the goal of providing a framework to promote a more resilient banking 
system.  Basel III can be delineated into three components: increased quantity and quality capital 
standards, liquidity and funding risk, and countercyclical tool providing flexibility to regulators.  
Basel III has three risk-weighted capital standards measured as percentages of RWA.  The 
three risk-weighted capital measures are the common equity ratio, the tier 1 capital ratio, and the 
total capital ratio.  The minimum capital standard is 4.5% for the common equity ratio, 6% for 
the tier 1 capital ratio, and 8% for the total capital ratio.  The capital components comprising 
each regulatory capital definition are discussed in section 2.7 based on how the FCA has 
proposed to calculate these ratios for FCS associations and System Banks.   
Basel III also proposed a capital conservation buffer (CCB).  The CCB requires banks to 
be at least 2.5% above each minimum capital ratio before they can make discretionary 
distributions including certain bonuses and dividend distributions. 
In addition, Basel III has proposed a countercyclical buffer.  The countercyclical buffer is 
an additional common equity tier 1 capital layer a bank must hold and is between 0% and 2.5% 
at the discretion of the regulator.   The countercyclical buffer is intended to provide regulators 
the ability to act during good and bad economic conditions to avoid another financial crisis.  
Ideally, regulators should increase the countercyclical buffer when systematic risk increases but 
lower the countercyclical buffer during periods of financial stress to avoid liquidity “hoarding.”  
Identifying when systematic risk is building up may be difficult to measure and may unequally 
penalize banks that are relatively less systemically risky. 
In addition to risk-weighted measures, Basel III has a non-risk-weighted capital ratio 
referred to as the leverage ratio.  The leverage ratio sets a maximum on the amount of leverage a 
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bank can possess.  It is calculated by dividing equity by non-risk weighted assets and off-balance 
sheet risks.  This ratio avoids the misspecification of risk-weights as it poses simple totals.  The 
leverage ratio’s minimal capital standard is set at 3%. 
Basel III limits a bank’s liquidity and funding risk by introducing two new standards 
referred to as the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and the net stable funding ratio (NSFR).  The 
LCR calculation is liquid assets divided by net cash outflow over a 30-day stressed funding 
scenario.  The NSFR is a risk-weighted measure of stable funding to assets needing stable 
funding over a one-year horizon.  The Basel Committee has set a target ratio for both the LCR 
and the NSFR of greater than 100%. 
The LCR and NSFR are not applicable at the association level because of the funding 
structure of the FCS.  However, these ratios would impact System Banks, which could have 
indirect implications for associations.  If the FCA implements the LCR and NSFR, a possible 
consequence is associations might have a higher cost of debt.  The impact of the LCR and NSFR 
are not modeled in this study because FCA has not finalized regulations relating to these ratios. 
 In summary, Basel III decreases the maximum risk-weighted leverage and non-risk 
weighted leverage a bank can possess.  Additionally, Basel III has put restrictions on liquidity 
and funding risk.  Analogs to the Basel III standards are expected to continue to be adopted by 
the FCA affecting the financial performance of associations and System Banks.  The APM 
models the implications of the Basel III capital requirements on associations.  The Basel III 






2.3   Summary of the Dodd-Frank Act (DFA) 
 
The DFA represents another post-financial crisis regulatory response that is affecting 
commercial banks.  It provides both increased oversight, transparency through regulations and a 
stress test known as the Dodd-Frank Act Stress Test (DFAST).  The DFA provides a more 
precise outline of regulators’ authorities and expectations of banks as the Basel II Accord’s Pillar 
2 and Pillar 3 recommended.  The DFA emphasizes better incentive alignment, increased 
oversight, and greater transparency.  
Examples of incentive alignment include whistleblower rights and requiring institutions 
originating asset-backed securities to hold at least 5% of the credit risk, creating better alignment 
of incentives between financial institutions and regulatory objectives.  
The DFA provides banking regulators increased oversight by introducing legal language 
allowing regulators to act earlier and added resources to help better understand financial 
institutions.  Examples include the regulators’ ability to designate positions that must be cleared 
by a Clearing House and a special assessment to be paid by the largest financial institution as 
determined by the newly created Financial Oversight Council.  Also, the newly created Office of 
Financial Research has been established to understand better the nuances of the financial sector 
(Huntington & Weiss, 2010).  
One way the DFA provides transparency is through the DFAST.  This provides 
transparency to markets about how banks would perform under stress scenarios.  DFAST 
projects banks’ financial performance under three hypothetical scenarios to see how different 
degrees and combinations of stress would impact banks’ financial position.  The DFAST puts 
banks through a hypothetical baseline scenario using approximately the average of economic 
forecasters’ projections, an adverse scenario where variables go “bad” and a severely adverse 
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scenario that is an even worse case (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2015).  
In the 2015 DFAST, projections are to be carried out over 12 quarters for each scenario using 28 
independent variables. 
The scenarios include U.S. measures for economic activity, asset values, financial 
conditions, and interest rates.  For example, the 2015 DFAST independent variables included: 
Real Gross Domestic Product, inflation, and exchange rates with major country groupings.  An 
additional market shock component is added in both the adverse and severely adverse scenarios.  
A market shock component is a sudden one-time change to asset prices, interest rates, and 
interest rate spreads reflecting increased uncertainty in economic conditions.  
The Federal Reserve in their “Policy Statement on the Scenario Design Framework for 
Stress Testing” in 2013 suggests an intent to stay flexible in their scenario definitions.  The 
Federal Reserve notes that DFAST is not meant to be a counter-cyclical capital buffer, but could 
have a countercyclical capital buffer effect.  In this policy statement, the Federal Reserve 
outlines how scenarios may be generated.  
The baseline scenario’s purpose is to test a bank financial performance under what is 
termed a “probable” scenario.  It is used to identify the differential impact of the adverse 
scenario and the severely adverse scenario.  The baseline scenario is not based on the Federal 
Reserve’s forecast of macroeconomic conditions going forward but the expectations of the 
private sector, other public sector organizations, and government agencies.  In situations where 
forecasts diverge considerably, the Federal Reserve chooses what it perceives to be the most 
plausible path over the length of the scenario. 
On the other extreme of the DFAST scenarios, the severely adverse scenario, the 
methodology used is a recession approach.  The recession approach projects independent 
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variables based on the Federal Reserve’s determination of the independent variables’ behavior in 
a “typical” recession or a recreation of a post-war period recession.  
The Federal Reserve’s severely adverse scenario increases the unemployment rate and 
decreases aggregate income and economic activity because these are common factors of all post-
war U.S. recessions.  The other independent variables are projected based on these three 
independent variables or subjective judgment.   
The adverse scenario is the most flexible of the three scenarios.  The Federal Reserve 
wrote “it can be developed in a number of different ways” partially driven by how the Federal 
Reserve plans to use the adverse scenario results (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, 2015).  The Federal Reserve outlined several frameworks for calibrating the adverse 
scenario.   
The first method creates a less severe version of the severely adverse scenario.  The 
Federal Reserve considers a positive aspect to this approach its ability to show if any non-linear 
impacts of independent variables exist.  A drawback to this approach is that it produces little new 
information because it is a less severe version of the severely adverse scenario.   
Another methodology uses the adverse scenario to test the impact of changes in certain 
independent variables.  The Federal Reserve could include independent variables in the adverse 
scenario that are excluded in the severely adverse scenario if the Federal Reserve believed the 
inclusion of these variables would make the severely adverse scenario to unlikely to occur.  
The third approach uses banks’ internally created mid-year stress test scenarios and living 
wills, that describe what would cause the bank to fail, to motivate DFAST scenarios.  The mid-
cycle scenarios or living wills would provide a differentiated scenario from the severely adverse 
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scenario and test the implications of another set of risks.  However, this approach still does not 
provide a standardized stress scenario to each bank. 
Lastly, the Federal Reserve could utilize a probabilistic approach with a level of 
probability occurring between the baseline and the severely adverse scenario.  This methodology 
may give the Federal Reserve the possibility of testing a new method that could have a dynamic 
impact later (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2015). This approach would 
standardize the likelihood of the stress across banks, thereby, providing an indicator for the 
relative safety and soundness of banks. 
For this thesis, a probabilistic approach is used, as it is believed to be best suited to 
standardize a level of stress across all associations.  Failure to standardize stress between 
associations could overstate the safety and soundness of riskier associations and vice versa.  For 
example, based on call report data from 2000-2015, the 90th percentile of nonaccrual loans as a 
percentage of total loans over this period is 3.53% for AgStar and only a 1.26% for Farm Credit 
Illinois.  A 2% nonaccrual loans as a percentage of total loans imputed into a model applied to 
both would overstate Farm Credit Illinois’ and understate AgStar’s credit risk relative to their 
own experiences. 
The probabilistic method is thought to be best able to identify the likelihood of an 
association hitting a critical point instead of the vulnerability to a predefined scenario.  The goal 
of a stress test is to examine the likelihood that an institution would fail a defined standard.  The 
combination of factors that cause poor credit quality (decreased commodity prices, higher 
interest rates) or rapid loan growth (lower interest rates, increased commodity prices) might be 




2.4   Summary of Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review 
 
The Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) is required in addition to 
DFAST for banks with over 250 billion dollars in assets or over 10 billion dollars in foreign 
exposure (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2015).  CCAR requires banks to 
provide their planed dividends and buybacks over the planning horizon to determine if they can 
pass DFAST’s adverse and severely adverse scenarios.  
Banks are required to run a counterparty default scenario under both the adverse and 
severely adverse scenario for the largest and interconnected banks.  The estimated losses and 
impact of derivatives and securities financing activities on capital are publicly reported.  
Additionally, CCAR requires banks to run stress tests internally and document their 
processes for creating the models.  The Federal Reserve can reject a bank’s capital plan because 
it fails to meet minimum capital standards, the capital plan has a severe weakness in a planning 
area, or substantial weaknesses across the planning process.  A rejected capital plan must be 
resubmitted for re-evaluation.  If the Federal Reserve still rejects the plan, the bank may not 
buybacks shares, pay dividends, or pay certain bonuses. 
FCS associations are not able to buy-back stock but do have patronage that acts as a 
dividend.  The APM can estimate the maximum patronage able to be distributed and still be a 
specified distance from a critical point over a projected one to five-year period, allowing for 







2.5   Key Risks of Financial Institutions 
 
Similar to commercial banks, associations hold capital in excess of the minimum capital 
standards to absorb possible stress resulting from several key risk measures.  Commonly used 
key risk measures are loan growth, credit quality, interest rate spreads, and non-interest 
expenses.  
Through DFAST and CCAR there is a tendency to outline a scenario and test how 
sensitive a financial institution is to a specific macroeconomic scenario.  However, the goal of a 
stress test is not to test the sensitivity of a specific scenario that may cause a given percentile of 
historical stress but instead assess how much stress the association can withstand and still meet a 
key performance measure.  The APM standardizes stress and directly tests safety and soundness 
across associations by selecting a percentile of stress for each of the key risk factors from 
associations’ histories, as opposed to estimating the impact of a change of a macroeconomic 
variable on key risk factors. 
The APM projects an association’s financial performance using three measures of credit 
quality.  The three credit quality measures are nonaccrual loans, allowance for loan losses 
(ALL), and net charge-offs all as a percent of gross loan items (GLI). 
Interest rate spreads are modeled using both the average loan interest rate and cost of 
debt.  Interest rate spread compression comes from a decrease in the average loan interest rate or 
increase in the cost of debt.  The income generated from each loan is the difference between the 
loan interest rate and cost of debt.  As the cost of debt increases or loan interest rate decreases, 
the income each year will be less, and capital will build more slowly.   
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An increase in non-interest expense (NIE) affects capital ratios by decreasing income, 
thus, causing retained earnings to accumulate slowly.  NIE is not as freely adjustable as interest 
rate spreads because economies of scale are the primary factor. 
An under-appreciated form of stress can arise from GLI growth.  It takes time to build 
retained earnings from the interest earned on loans.  GLI growth is dilutive to capital by 
expanding the denominator of capital ratios, thus, reducing key capital ratios once thought 
economically desirable. 
Stress tests will better standardize stress scenarios and help better reflect the safety and 
soundness of associations by moving away from macroeconomic stress scenarios and towards 
percentiles of stress of specific financial metrics related to credit, loan growth, interest rate 
spreads, and NIE.  These seven key risk factors above are believed to adequately capture all 
possible risks that an association will encounter from a scenario of macroeconomic conditions. 
 
2.6   Farm Credit System Capital Structure 
 
The current FCS capital standards are similar, yet differentiated, from commercial banks’ 
capital standards.  The differentiated capital standards are necessary due to System Banks’ and 
associations’ unique forms of capital and the FCS structure.  This section provides an overview 
of forms of capital used by associations and unique adjustments to FCS institutions capital ratios 
due to the structure of the FCS. 
Commercial banks’ capital consists of retained earnings, common stock, and preferred 
stock.  Capital is often returned to shareholder in the form of dividends.  Dividends are typically 
returned as an absolute dollar amount per share. 
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Associations’ equity consists of cooperative stock, preferred stock, unallocated retained 
earnings (URE) and allocated surplus.  Additionally, there is double counting of capital when 
examining the FCS as a whole due to associations’ investment in their System Bank. 
 Cooperative stock is a form of equity that borrowers purchase when a customer obtains a 
loan from an association.  Associations typically set the cooperative stock requirement at the 
lesser of 2% of loan volume or $1,000.  The value of the stock is redeemed at its issued value 
and does not appreciate as an association’s net worth increases. 
Preferred stock is third-party capital invested into an association.  Currently, only two 
associations within the FCS have this form of capital on their balance sheet.  The cooperative 
stock is subordinate to preferred stock in liquidation. 
Unlike banks, the retained earnings of associations have two categories: Unallocated 
retained earnings and allocated surplus.  The difference between the two is that allocated surplus 
is designated to an individual and can have an associated retirement date.  Unallocated retained 
earnings, by contrast, has no specific ownership of record and has no retirement date associated 
with the equity, making it a permanent source of capital to withstand stress.     
As a cooperative, borrowers are also the owners, but the value of their cooperative stock 
does not change as the value of the association’s equity increases.  The value of a borrower's 
equity is changed by portions of earning being allocated to borrowers.  The allocation of earnings 
is based on each borrower’s contribution to earnings.   The allocated earnings are known as 
allocated surplus and eventually can be retired.  Allocated surplus increases the cooperative 
owners’ investment while providing capital for managing stress.  Several associations allocate 
surplus but do not retire it making it an equivalent to unallocated retained earnings. 
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Associations can return equity to their owners by making a patronage payment.  The 
patronage payment is based on a borrower’s contribution to an association's earnings. Typically, 
associations make a patronage payment instead of allocating surplus. 
The FCS structure is another contributing factor to the differentiated capital standards 
between FCS entities and commercial banks.  An association is typically required to invest 
between 2-3% of their direct note volume into their System Bank.  The Farm Credit System’s 
regulatory capital ratios would appear overstated if both associations and the System Banks 
could count this investment in their regulatory capital ratios due to the associations’ investments 
in their System Banks comprising a large share of System Banks’ equity.  FCA has addressed 
this issue by allowing only the System Bank to include the investment in their regulatory capital 
ratios. 
 
2.7   Summary of Farm Credit System’s Capital Standards Changes   
 
On March 10, 2016, FCA released a fact sheet on the final rulemaking on the calculations 
and minimum standards for the common equity tier 1 ratio, tier 1 ratio, total capital ratio, and 
leverage ratio.  The current capital standards became effective January 1, 2017.  The current 
capital standards also include a capital conservation buffer that is being phased in over a three-
year period.  The common equity tier 1 ratio, tier 1 ratio, total capital ratio, and the leverage ratio 
replace core surplus and total surplus as the primary regulatory capital ratios.  The prior and 
current standards are summarized in this section. 
The capital ratios previously used as the measures of solvency for FCS institutions were 
the permanent capital ratio (PCR), total surplus ratio (TSR), and core surplus ratio (CSR).  The 
prior three capital ratios were all in relation to RWA.  The regulatory minimum for each ratio was 
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7%, 7%, and 3.5%, respectively.  Effective January 1, 2017, the CSR and TSR are no longer 
enforced regulatory capital ratios. 
Core surplus was comprised of URE, certain allocated surplus, and noncumulative 
perpetual preferred stock.  At least 1.5% of the 3.5% minimum CSR must be made up of URE 
and noncumulative perpetual preferred stock.  Allocated surplus not expected to be retired for at 
least three years was also included (Farm Credit Administration, 2013).  Investments in other 
FCS institutions was deducted from core surplus in accordance to the agreement between the 
FCS entities to avoid the overstating of the FCS’s aggregate capital.  
Total surplus included URE, allocated surplus, and other debt and equity that FCA 
deemed appropriate to include.  Investments in other FCS institutions was deducted from total 
surplus in accordance with the agreement between the FCS institutions because it could only be 
counted in one institution’s regulatory capital ratios.  Allocated equities not expected to be 
retired for at least five years from being allocated were also included (Farm Credit 
Administration, 2013). 
Permanent capital is calculated as total surplus plus cooperative stock (Farm Credit 
Administration, 2016).  The PCR remains a regulatory capital standard under the current capital 
regulations.  The inclusion of cooperative stock in permanent capital makes the PCR always 
slightly higher than the TSR.  The regulatory capital ratios that replaced CSR and TSR are 
summarized next. 
The first of the current regulatory capital standards is the tier 1 capital ratio.  The tier 1 
capital ratio minimum standard is set a 6%.  Tier 1 capital is comprised of two components: 
common equity tier 1 capital (CET1) and additional tier 1 capital (AT1).  CET1 must comprise 
4.5% of RWA and the remaining 1.5% can come from a combination of CET1 and AT1. 
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CET1 is comprised of unallocated retained earnings and common cooperative equities.  AT1 
is comprised of equities that meet most of the criteria of CET1.  The main source of AT1 is 
preferred stock.  The CET1 includes the following: 
• Regulatory minimum cooperative stock 
• Equity perpetual and subordinate to preferred stock, subordinated debt, and liabilities of the 
association 
• Equity not to be retired for a minimum of seven years after issuance 
Associations also must maintain a total capital ratio of at least 8%.  The total capital ratio 
is calculated by dividing total capital by RWA.  Total capital is composed of CET1, AT1, tier 2 
capital, and ALL up to 1.25% of RWA.  Tier 2 capital includes equities and third-party capital 
(preferred stock and subordinated debt) that meet the following criteria: 
• Original maturity of five or more years 
• Equities not to be retired for a minimum of five years after being issued 
The FCA has also implemented a minimum leverage ratio of 4%.  The leverage ratio is 
the ratio of tier 1 capital to total assets for System Banks and associations.  URE and equivalents 
must comprise 1.5% of total assets.   
The FCA also adopted a capital conservation buffer.  The capital conservation buffer 
requires associations to have an additional 2.5% of capital above all regulatory ratios before 
being able to pay patronage or discretionary bonuses.  The capital conservation buffer is being 
phased in over three years. 




• Other Financial Institutions (OFIs) are to be risk-weighting increased from 50% to 100% 
with the exception of depository institutions and credit unions. 
• High volatility commercial real estate risk-weighting increased from 100% to 150%. 
• All past-due and nonaccrual exposures are risk-weighted at 150%.  Formerly, only residential 
exposures past due or nonaccrual were risk-weighted at 150%.  The exception is any portion 
guaranteed or secured by financial collateral. 
• Commitments under 14 months that are not unconditionally cancelable risk-weighting were 
increased from 0% to 20%. 
 
2.8   Summary  
 
 The regulation on the banking industry through Basel III, DFAST, and CCAR have 
possible implications as to the direction the FCA takes regulatory policy.   FCA has already 
implemented analogs to the Basel III ratios where appropriate given the structure of the FCS.  
However, for example, FCA has not put in place a NSFR or LCR as they may not be suitable for 
associations given that they operate on a line of credit from their System Bank.  However, these 
may be appropriate at the System Bank level and may indirectly impact associations.  This 
study’s methodology for testing the safety and soundness may provide a starting point for a low-
burden stress test for the Farm Credit System.  Methodologies for testing, and theories on the 
impact of capital requirements on safety and soundness in the banking sector may be applicable 










Figure 2.1 FCS System Banks’ and Affiliated Associations’ Territories 

















CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
This study is unique in that it evaluates the implications of the FCS’s current capital 
regulations using a methodology that standardizes the severity of shocks in a stress test and 
allows comparisons across alternative regulatory frameworks.  Past research has focused on the 
banking sector and has spent relatively less time examining the FCS possibly because of the 
difficulty in modeling associations, and because it may be assumed results apply to both.  Two 
veins of literature are explored to understand and test the implications of the proposed capital 
regulations on the FCS.  First, a conceptual understanding of regulations impact on financial 
institution’s financial performance and incentives are explored.  Secondly, methodologies 
previously used to test the capital adequacy of the financial institutions are examined. 
 
3.1   Previous Work - System Bank Level Implications 
 
In addition to the currently implemented capital regulations, the FCA is investigating if 
minimal NSFR and LCR measures should be added as required regulatory standards.  While 
these regulatory ratios would be at the System Bank level, there could be implications at the 
association level. 
King (2013) estimates commercial banks historical NSFR analogs and cost-effective 
ways of meeting the NSFR using bank-level year-end data from 2009 for banks from 15 
countries with over 100 million dollars in assets.  King creates a structured model that shows 
how the balance sheet and income statement change as structural changes to funding occur with 
assumptions about the cost of debt depending on the debt’s maturity and the bank’s equity 




Banks that do not meet the minimum NSFR will need to extend the maturity of their debt beyond 
one year, issue equity, shrink the balance sheet, adjust the maturity of assets on balance sheet, or 
increase their share of deposits.   
Dietrich, Hess, Wanzenried (2014) examine the characteristics of banks that do not meet 
the NSFR minimal standard.  NSFR determinates are estimated using a data set of 921 Western 
European banks between 1996 and 2010 using a general method of moments estimator.  Banks 
that do not meet the implied historical NSFR tend to fall into the categories of large, fast-
growing, or active in asset management and investment banking.  Contrary to expectations, they 
find that banks with lower NSFR tend to be less profitable and their returns are more volatile.  
The FCS System Banks likely do not fall into any of these categories that are prone to fall short 
of the NSFR. 
Vazquez and Federico (2015) study the impact a bank’s funding structure has on the 
probability of bank failure.  The impact of a bank’s funding structure is estimated using a probit 
model and a data set of 11,000 U.S. and European banks between 2001 to 2009.  Vazquez and 
Federico estimate probit models for subsamples of banks based on the banks’ equity to assets 
ratio and estimated NSFR.  Additionally, robustness tests were conducted using alternative 
definitions of bank failure, liquidity, and capital.  Vazquez and Federico conclude that small 
domestic banks are more vulnerable to liquidity risk.  Larger banks with a global presence are 
more vulnerable to funding risk due to higher leverage.  Vazquez and Federico’s findings 
support the NSFR and LCR will help decrease systematic risk. 
Kiema and Jokivuolle (2014) use a theoretical model to illustrate how the leverage ratio 
could manipulate banks’ lending strategies.  The model assumes two types of banks: low-risk 




loans.  Before the leverage ratio is introduced, low-risk banks only originate low-risk loans and 
high-risk banks only originate high-risk loans.  The model shows low-risk banks would start 
diversifying their loan portfolio with high-risk loans.  Additionally, high-risk banks would start 
adding low-risk loans to their portfolio.   
Consequently, the leverage ratio causes banks to be less specialized and portfolios to 
become more alike, creating additional systematic risk.  The FCS’s territory restriction and loan 
purpose restrictions makes it unlikely the leverage ratio will impact associations’ lending 
strategies because they have limited alternative options to provide financing too.  Moreover, the 
cooperative structure and ability to move assets from an association to the System Bank may 
become appealing if the leverage ratio becomes binding for a System Bank.  How assets can be 
transferred to another FCS entity is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. 
System Banks and associations are required to meet the regulatory minimum leverage 
ratio of 4%.  The RWA-to-assets ratio provides an indicator of the case where the leverage ratio 
could be the binding regulatory capital ratio.  The RWA-to-assets ratio where the leverage ratio 
becomes binding can be estimated by dividing the regulatory minimum leverage ratio by the 
regulatory minimum tier 1 capital ratio due to the only difference between the ratios being the 
denominators.  Approximately, the RWA-to-assets ratio needs to be less than 0.67 for the 
leverage ratio to be the binding capital ratio.  The RWA-to-assets ratio is effectively the average 
risk-weighting on an FCS institution’s assets and implies that if the average risk weighting on an 
FCS institution’s assets is 67% or less than the leverage ratio, is more binding than the tier 1 
capital standard.  System Banks have a low RWA-to-assets ratio due to their portfolios consisting 
primarily of wholesale loans that are risk-weighted at 20%, compared to associations’ loan 




Due to the low RWA-to-assets ratio of System Banks and a RWA-to-assets ratio close to one on 
average for associations, it is anticipated the leverage ratio will only be a binding capital 
constraint to System Banks.  Associations could be indirectly impacted if a System Banks retains 
more of their earnings to stay above the minimum regulatory leverage ratio. 
This study assumes the impact of the leverage ratio, NSFR, and LCR on System Banks 
does not impact associations.  The APM can model the impacts of these variables by changing 
the level of stress for the key risk factors they affect, but currently, there is no final ruling on the 
NSFR and LCR ratios, and thus, left for future work. 
 
3.2   Previous Work - Impact of Regulations on Banks’ Incentives 
 
An important determinant of the net impact of regulations is the banking sector’s 
responses to regulation.  This subsection of literature examines the impact regulations have on 
the banking sector directly through regulatory requirements.  Additionally, this section reviews 
the indirect implications of regulations once it is assumed that financial institutions can change 
their behavior after considering the regulatory environment. 
VanHouse (2007) provides a review of the variety of theories related to the implications 
of risk-based capital requirements on safety and soundness of the banking sector.  Past methods 
have examined risk-weighted capital requirements from a portfolio or a moral-hazard 
perspective.  From the portfolio standpoint, risk-weighted capital requirements may encourage 
banks to hold assets the regulators perceive to be low-risk assets and create a disincentive to 
diversify.  The moral hazard perspective examines issues with incentives between management, 
shareholders, and creditors, and concluded risk-weighted capital ratios alone are not enough.  




as market discipline of Basel II, or the NSFR and LCR are needed additions.  FCS institutions’ 
portfolio decisions are limited due to their charter.  Additionally, the cooperative structure 
changes the incentives between management, shareholders, and creditors because shareholders 
do not receive the full return to increased profitability outside of lower interest rates or higher 
patronage on their loans.  FCS associations’ management teams do not have an equity price to 
concern themselves with and may place more weight on being a “safe” financial institution.    
González (2005) assesses the impact of regulations on banks' incentives to take risks.  
The analysis utilized a data set of 251 banks from 36 countries, proxy variables including an 
index for banking regulation by country, the percentage of loans not performing, and the daily 
standard deviation of the stock price.  González measures the impact of regulations using a two-
step least squares process.  In the first stage, Tobin’s Q ratio (market value to book value) is 
estimated.  For robustness, the model was estimated using random effects, weighted least 
squares, and a variety of additional specifications adjusting for possible endogeneity.   González 
concludes increased regulation increases bank risk possibly due to a lower Tobin’s Q ratio in 
countries with more regulation.   
While the literature is mixed, arguments against regulation have pointed to portfolio 
diversification choices and risk-taking incentives.  Associations are constrained to originating 
agricultural related loans primarily in their territory, resulting in associations having limited 
options to adjust the composition of their portfolios.  Because of these constraints, the negative 







3.3   Previous Work - Stress Test Methodology 
 
Stress tests vary in degree of complexity and data requirements.  DFAST and CCAR are 
both “bottom-up” stress tests that are data intensive.  Another subsection of the stress testing 
literature is the “top-down” models that perform comparably to DFAST and CCAR, but that are 
less burdensome regarding modeling time and data requirements.      
Sorge (2004) provides a review of the current methodologies for stress testing financial 
institutions.  Sorge divides the methods into two categories: piecewise approach and integrated 
approach.  Piecewise models are typically built as linear estimations of the impact of macro 
factors, or a structural model has on a bank’s financial performance.  Piecewise models are 
referred to in this project as “top-down” methods.  These models are less computationally 
burdensome compared to those in the integrated approach but suffer from parameter instability.  
On the other hand, integrated approaches capture the non-linearity of various macroeconomic 
variables but at the cost of being more burdensome. 
The first example of a top-down approach is by Acharyaa, Englea, and Pierret (2013).  
They use New York University’s Volatility Lab (VLAB) systematic risk (SRISK) model to test 
the capital adequacy of banks.  As opposed to DFAST’s accounting based data model, SRISK 
uses only historical stock price, market cap, and leverage data to determine capital adequacy.  
SRISK uses a scenario of a 40% drop in equity prices over six months.  It calculates the long-run 
marginal expected shortfall defined as the co-movement between the stock price to the market 
index and is multiplied by the market capitalization of stock at the beginning of the six-month 
stress period.  They conclude that their model benchmarks a bank’s performance well compared 




Covas, Rump, and Zakrajsek (2013) use a quantile fixed effects autoregressive regression 
to estimate the impact of macroeconomic variables on the capital adequacy of a panel of large 
bank holding companies.  Next, density forecasts are calculated giving a range of projected 
capital ratios along with net charge-offs and pre-provision net revenue.  Covas, Rump, and 
Zakrajsek find that this method outperforms ordinary least squares because of their model's 
ability to capture the fat tails of credit loss.   Density forecasts give a better idea of the impact of 
potential stress on a bank by not focusing solely on the mean tier 1 capital ratio, but the 
confidence interval surrounding the mean projected tier 1 capital ratio.  
Hirtle, Kovner, Vickery, and Bhanet (2015) create the Capital and Loss Assessment 
under Stress Scenarios (CLASS) model.  It uses publicly available data to estimate the impact of 
stressful conditions on a bank’s capital position.  They utilize econometric models to estimate the 
relationship of a certain balance sheet and income statement items and ratios to then test how 
they affect projected balance sheets and income statements.  The estimation of the impact of 
macroeconomic variables is conducted using an autoregression and a set of macroeconomic 
variables.  They find that their model closely follows actual net charge-offs, net income, and pre-
provision net revenue numbers. 
Kapinos and Mitnik (2015) estimate the impact of macroeconomic variables on pre-
provision net revenue and net charge-offs as a percentage of loans using the macroeconomic 
variables from CCAR.  A least absolute shrinkage selection operator is used to estimate which 
variable are most important to address the issue of high collinearity of many of the CCAR 
variables.  Next, a dynamic panel model is used to evaluate the impact on pre-provision net 
revenue and net charge-offs as a percentage of loans.  A structured model with assumptions 




the scenario horizon to estimate the impact on capital ratios.  Their model’s results closely relate 
to observed losses in the financial crisis from 2007 to 2009. 
Guerrieri and Welch (2012) test the usefulness of macroeconomic variables as forecasters 
of bank performance using measures of credit, revenue, and capital.  A combination forecast 
approach is used to test macroeconomic variables ability to predict these measures of bank 
performance.  The forecasts’ performances are tested using the root mean square errors.  They 
find that macroeconomic variables are not useful predictors for all measures of bank 
performance, with the implication that using macroeconomic variables to outline a stress 
scenario could be unreliable too. 
The preceding methodologies outlined show that it is possible to have an informative 
stress test that is not burdensome on the regulators and financial institutions.  The approach 
utilized in this study fits into these non-burdensome, top-down methods.  The one notable 
difference is the approach used in this study uses a probabilistic approach instead of linking it to 
macroeconomic factors.  The probabilistic approach is believed to be better at testing the safety 






CHAPTER 4: METHODS 
 
 
Approaches to estimating capital adequacy measures range broadly in data requirements 
and sophistication.  All stress test methods have strengths and weakness, but the common 
objective is to be a useful indicator of safety and soundness.  This study uses the APM developed 
at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign.  The APM is a firm level pro forma financial 
model using a probabilistic approach to calibrate key risk factors.  The key risk factors are the 
seven variables used to project each year’s income statement and balance sheet.  The APM’s 
output includes a variety of financial measures providing an indicator of a stress scenario’s 
impact on an association’s capital, earnings, credit quality, and liquidity.  This study uses the 
APM to measure differences in safety and soundness of alternative capital regulations. 
The key risk factors examined include loan growth rate, three indicators of credit quality 
(allowance for loan losses, nonaccrual loans, and net charge-offs) as a percentage of gross loan 
items, two measures of interest rate spreads (cost of debt and average loan interest rate) and 
percentage change in non-interest expense.  The value of each key risk factor is calibrated based 
on a percentile of stress from the association’s history, except the measures of interest rate 
spread.  The cost of debt and average loan interest rate are historically non-stationary; thus, these 
measures are projected as basis point change from the last observed year.   
The remainder of this chapter describes the APM’s methodology for calibrating the 
probabilistic stress estimation, calculating projected regulatory capital ratios, assumptions for 
projecting balance sheet and income statements, assumptions of management discretionary 
decisions, and the stress tests scenarios and reverse stress test used to compare the safety and 




are included showing the details of the projected financials including: the key risk factor inputs, 
balance sheets, income statements, and regulatory capital ratios. 
 
4.1   Stress Level Estimation 
 
The goal of a probabilistic methodology is not to be dependent on a defined scenario of 
macroeconomic factors, but instead to provide a standardized degree of stress to each 
association.  For example, a DFAST style stress test forecasting a large decline in corn prices 
would be stressful to an association with a large percentage of loans to grain farmers but could 
be beneficial to an association with a high percentage of loans to cattle farmers.  Using common 
macroeconomic factors as the stress variables would result in unequal degrees of stress across 
associations. 
Table 4.1 shows the calculation of the key risk factors’ historical values, and a short 
name for each ratio.  Table 4.2 provides the calculation used to project each key risk factor.    
The interest rate spread measures are projected as basis point change from the beginning year.  
The other five key risk factors are estimated as a percentile from the associations’ histories.  
%ALL is projected based on a percentile after 2003 due to changes in the ALL calculation starting 
in 2004 (Farm Credit Illinois, 2005). The remaining key risk factors are projected as a percentile 
of stress from 2000 to 2015.  The key risk factors are then used to project the income statement 
and balance sheet for each of the projected periods. 
 Table 4.3 provides the assumptions used for projecting extraordinary items, net other 
comprehensive income, and patronage distribution.  These assumptions capture an association’s 





4.2   Income Statement and Balance Sheet Assumptions 
 
After the level of stress for each key risk factor over a five-year period is selected, they 
are fed through integrated pro forma balance sheet and income statement for each of the 
projected five years.  The balance sheet and income statement for each period are projected 
based on the previous balance sheet, key risk factor assumptions, and assumptions about the 
relationship between the different balance sheet and income statement items.  Table 4.4 – 4.6 
describe the calculations for projecting the balance sheet items in period t for assets, liabilities, 
and equity, respectively.  The income statement projection is summarized in Table 4.7.  The 
income statement links one balance sheet from one period to the next.  An association can 
allocate surplus or pay patronage in cash a portion of its comprehensive income and unallocated 
retained earnings.  Table 4.7 describes the assumption to pay patronage.  The APM replicas an 
association’s management's expected decision not to distribute capital if the association is not as 
profitable as desired.  The APM defines the threshold at which an association will not pay 
patronage as a return on assets below one percent.  The APM is demonstrated in section 4.5 and 
4.6.   
 
4.3   Projecting Capital Ratios 
 
 This section documents how an association’s financial information is used to estimate the 
projected prior and current regulatory capital ratios.  Table 4.8 summarizes how the components 
of the prior and current regulatory capital categories are calculated.       
Historically, core surplus, total surplus, and permanent capital have all made up a 




retained earnings, allocated equities, and capital stock, it is expected going forward the new 
capital ratios will comprise a relatively constant share of equity as well. 
Core surplus is estimated by taking equity and subtracting the equity investment in other 
FCS institutions.  Total surplus and permanent capital are both projected as the average of the 
percentage of equity the previous two years.  Common equity tier 1, tier 1, and tier 2 capital 
components are also projected as the average of the percentage of equity the previous two years 
using the estimated historical analogs for these capital categories.  For total capital, ALL is added 
up to 1.25% of RWA. 
Risk-weights on several asset categories have changed causing differences between prior 
and current RWA.  Risk-weighting on loans for high volatility commercial real estate and OFIs 
are both assumed to not impact RWA.  The risk-sensitivity approach, as opposed to credit ratings, 
is assumed not to impact RWA.  Additionally, unfunded commitments are assumed to stay 
proportional to production/intermediate-term loans in the last quarter of 2015. 
The prior capital ratio’s RWA are projected proportional to the average RWA-to-assets 
ratio the previous two years and multiplied by assets at period t.  The projected RWA are then 
adjusted by the projected change in nonaccrual residential loan volume over trend in period t 
multiplied by the 150% risk-weight. 
The current capital standards require all non-accrual loans to be risk-weighted at 150%.  
The projected current capital ratio’s RWA calculation starts the same as the prior capital ratio’s 
RWA calculation with additional assumptions being incorporated.  Where the current RWA differ 
is all nonaccrual loan volume is risk-weighted at 150%.  The projected current RWA also factor 




 Table 4.9 shows how the prior capital ratios compare to the current capital standards for 
Farm Credit Illinois.  The current PCR is lower than the historical PCR due to increased RWA.  
Associations with subordinate debt or preferred stock have a greater separation between capital 
ratios levels.  Farm Credit Illinois does not use any third-party capital. 
 In general, as of year-end 2015, the differences between association prior and current 
capital ratios would be minimal due to the composition of the numerators of the current and prior 
capital ratios and the changes to the denominator of current capital ratios.  The majority of 
associations’ equity consisting URE or URE equivalents causing the numerators of the current 
and prior standards to be similar for all of the capital ratios.  Additionally, the denotators will be 
very similar due to the primary change being the risk weighting of nonaccrual loans from 100% 
to 150%.  The good economic positions in agriculture has resulted in the majority of associations 
having minimal nonaccrual loans resulting in minimal differences in the denominators of the 
prior and current capital ratios as of year-end 2015.  However, as credit stress in agriculture 
increases, the differences in the denominators will increase due to nonaccrual loans increasing as 
a percentage of loan volume. 
 
4.4   Scenario Selection 
 
This study illustrates the impact of the alternative capital regulations in a loan growth 
stress scenario and a credit quality stress scenario.  Additionally, reverse stress tests are run to 
see how “bad” things must be for an association to hit a critical point, such as a minimum capital 
standard, illustrating the difference in safety and soundness under the alternative capital 




compare the two regulatory capital regimes and provide insight into the current financial position 
of the FCS. 
The loan growth stress scenario’s key risk factors are projected to match what is expected 
to be associated with “good” economic conditions.  For most associations, the majority of loans 
are for the purchase of farmland.  The value of land is expected to increase during good 
economic conditions due to higher returns associated with this asset.  Loan growth is expected to 
increase as the value of land increases due to a need to finance the asset.  Economic conditions 
improving causes credit quality to improve, therefore, decreasing nonaccrual loans, allowance 
for loan losses, and net charge-offs as a percentage of GLI.  Interest rate spreads might decrease 
to attract more loans as economic conditions improve. 
Table 4.10 shows each key risk factors’ percentile of stress for each year over the five-
year period for the loan growth stress test.  The loan growth scenario is replicated by using the 
90th percentile GLI growth rate, 50th percentile ALL, net charge-offs, and nonaccrual loan rate as 
a percentage GLI for each item over a five-year period.  NIE percentage change will also be set 
at the 50th percentile.  The cost of debt will stay at what it was in 2015, and the average loan 
interest rate is decreased by one-hundred basis points from its value in 2015.  
 Table 4.11 shows each key risk factors percentile of stress for each year over the five-
year period for the credit quality stress test.  The credit stress scenario used the 95th percentile of 
stress ALL, net charge-offs, and nonaccrual loan rate as a percentage GLI for each year over a 
five-year period.  As mentioned before, GLI growth, in theory, has an inverse relationship to 
credit quality and is projected at the 50th percentile of stress.  NIE is also projected at the 50th 




credit conditions could raise the association’s cost of debt.  It is assumed the cost of debt rises 
100 basis points.  Average loan interest rate is kept at the same level as it was in 2015. 
 In addition to those two stress tests, two reverse stress tests are conducted: the loan 
growth and credit quality reverse stress tests.  These reverse stress tests are designed to test how 
far a set of key risk factors must change for a capital ratio to hit a critical point by the end of the 
projection period, thereby providing an indicator of relative safety and soundness of the 
alternative capital standards.  The other key risk factors’ percentiles are predefined for each 
period.  In the credit quality reverse stress test, the three credit factors are simultaneously 
increased until one of the capital ratios under the prior capital standards hits a minimum 
regulatory ratio at the end of the five-year period.  If one of the current capital ratios is below the 
minimum capital standard, this implies the current capital standards are more binding than the 
prior capital standards. 
 The credit quality reverse stress scenario is done by simultaneously adjusting the three 
credit quality key risk factors over the five-year period until one of the capital ratios under the 
prior capital standards hits a minimum regulatory ratio at the end of the five-year period.  Table 
4.12 show the key risk factor values over the five-year period.  The percentiles of stress for the 
other six key risk factors match the values of the credit stress scenarios’ key risk factors as 
shown in Table 4.10.  It was decided to use the loan growth stress scenarios as the starting point 
for the credit quality reverse stress test to avoid possible criticisms for underestimating loan 
growth and thus overstating the credit stress needed to breach a minimum regulatory capital 
standard.  If one of the current capital ratios is below the minimum capital standard, this implies 




The loan growth reverse stress test is done by changing the GLI growth rate over the five-
year period until one of the capital ratios under the prior capital standards hits a minimum 
regulatory ratio at the end of the five-year period.  Table 4.13 shows the key risk factor values 
over the five-year period.  The percentiles of stress for the other six key risk factors match the 
values of the credit stress scenarios’ key risk factors as shown in Table 4.11.  It was decided to 
use the credit stress scenarios as the starting point for the loan growth reverse stress test to avoid 
possible criticisms for underestimating credit stress and thus overstating the loan growth needed 
to breach a minimum regulatory capital standard.  If one of the current capital ratios is below the 
minimum capital standard, this implies the current capital standards are more binding than the 
prior capital standards. 
The two stress scenarios and the two reverse stress tests are designed to provide insights 
into several points of interest.  The two stress scenarios provide an indication of the capital 
adequacy of the associations examined, a demonstration of the flexibility of the APM to stress 
test associations, and relative stressfulness of loan growth and credit quality on associations.  The 
reverse stress tests build upon the two stress tests by showing how much stress it would take for 
an association to hit a minimum regulatory capital standard, providing another indication of the 
capital adequacy of associations and another demonstration of the capabilities of the APM.  
Additionally, provides a straightforward comparison of the relative safety a soundness of the two 
regulatory capital standards. 
 
4.5   Association Planning Model Demonstration 
 
 The APM’s functionality is illustrated by running a scenario on Farm Credit Illinois.  




income statement from 2012 to 2015.  These are Farm Credit Illinois’ financials over the last 
observed four years. 
Table 4.14 shows Farm Credit Illinois’ assets from 2012-2015.  The largest share of Farm 
Credit Illinois’ assets is loans and accrued interest receivables.  There is also a significant 
percentage of equity investment in other farm credit institutions.  Most of the investment in other 
Farm Credit institutions is comprised of the required investment in the System Bank.  
Table 4.15 shows that the majority of Farm Credit Illinois’ liabilities are the notes 
payable to other FCS institutions and accrued interest.  Most of the note payable to other FCS 
institutions and accrued interest is from Farm Credit Illinois’ line of credit from their System 
Bank.  
Farm Credit Illinois is representative of most associations with earned surplus making up 
most of the equity as illustrated in Table 4.16.  Earned surplus includes both unallocated retained 
earnings and allocated surplus.  Capital stock encompasses cooperative stock and preferred 
stock.  Farm Credit Illinois has no preferred stock. 
Table 4.17 is the income statement of Farm Credit Illinois from 2012 to 2015.  Most of 
Farm Credit Illinois’ revenue comes from interest earned on loans.  The remainder of the revenue 
is from other services generating fee income and patronage from the System Bank based on an 
association’s share of the System Bank’s profit. 
Table 4.18 provides other important financial items including: GLI, URE, and the 
estimated percent URE makes up of equity in each period.  GLI is the majority of Farm Credit 
Illinois’ assets and is representative of most associations.  URE comprises approximately 99% of 
Farm Credit Illinois’ equity.  Both the prior and current capital standards include URE in the 




equity, it is expected that the numerators of most the current capital ratios will be similar to the 
numerators of the prior capital ratios. 
Next, a scenario is defined to calculate the key risk factors for each period.  For this 
demonstration, each of the key risk factors are set at the 50th percentile except for CofD and 
LoanRate, that are set at the 2015 level for ever year.  Table 4.19 summarizes the value each key 
risk factor takes going forward and the comparison to the previous four years.   
Table 4.20– 4.24 shows the projected 2016-2020 income statements, other financial 
items, and the balance sheets’ assets, liabilities, and equity.  Net income over the five-year period 
increased every year.  Table 21 shows the majority of the increase in net income is from 
increased net interest income on the loan portfolio.  Interest rate spread measures are the same as 
the end of 2015, meaning, the growth in interest income is from the loan portfolio growing. 
Table 4.22 shows Farm Credit Illinois’ projected equity from 2016 to 2020.  Net income 
can be added to earned surplus or can be paid out in patronage.  Farm Credit Illinois is projected 
to pay no patronage, as it has not historically.  Therefore, all of Farm Credit Illinois’ net income 
is added to equity. 
Table 4.23 shows Farm Credit Illinois’ liabilities.  Farm Credit Illinois’ increases its 
notes payable from AgriBank to fund its loan growth.  Notes payable increases due to equity 
growing slower than assets. 
Capital ratios’ numerators are estimated assuming they make up a constant portion of 
equity.  Figure 4.1 shows the historical relationship between total surplus and permanent capital 
both as a percentage of equity.  Both ratios comprise a relatively stable portion of equity over 
time, providing support for the assumption of projecting these regulatory capital categories as a 




 Capital ratios’ denominator is another important component of the capital ratio 
calculation.  Capital ratios’ RWA are projected assuming they are proportional to assets and then 
adjusted for nonaccrual loan volume changes.  Figure 4.2 displays Farm Credit Illinois’ historical 
RWA-to-assets ratio.  Farm Credit Illinois’ RWA-to-assets ratio has fluctuated between 101% to 
105% since 2007.  The RWA-to-assets ratio has been relatively stable historically providing 
support for using this assumption to project RWA. 
Table 4.24 contains Farm Credit Illinois’ historical capital ratios and analogs to the 
current capital ratios from 2014 to 2015 and the projections of the alternative capital ratios from 
2016 to 2020.  Farm Credit Illinois was profitable over the period, yet, all their capital ratios fell 
slightly in the projected period as GLI growth was dilutive to their capital ratios. 
The results support that if credit quality and loan growth rates return to their historical 
medians, Farm Credit Illinois will not be able to increase their capital ratios at its current interest 
rate spreads.  Notably, the prior and current capital ratio levels are very similar because most of 
Farm Credit Illinois’ equity is comprised on unallocated retained earnings.  It is expected when 
credit stress increases there will be a greater separation between the two capital standards ratios 
due to the higher risk-weights on nonaccrual loans under the current capital standards.  The 
severity and implications of these alternative capital standards is explored in detail in Chapter 6 
and Chapter 7. 
 
4.6   Association Planning Model Demonstration - 1980’s Farm Crisis Scenario 
 
The APM can replicate a range of economic scenarios over a one to five-year horizon.  




performance.  The 1980’s was a period of rapid loan growth followed by a period of extreme 
credit stress across the FCS. 
Table 4.25 shows the projected key risk factors replicating the credit environment of the 
1980’s for projected period 2016 to 2020.  These factors are based on a United States 
Department of Agriculture report from 2002 where Stam et al., provided a summary of the 
1980’s credit conditions and assumptions on how interest rate spreads and loan growth act under 
this extreme credit stress.  In the scenario, the three credit key risk factors increase to well above 
their 90th percentile of stress observed since 2000.  The decreased credit quality results in the 
association's cost of debt increasing from 2018 to 2020.  Non-interest expense is set at the 50th 
percentile of stress all five years.  Loan growth is set at the 50th percentile of stress the first two 
years and set at the 40th percentile of stress the last three years.  The average loan interest rate 
decreases the first two projected years slightly then increases the next three years to compensate 
for the higher cost of debt and deteriorating credit quality.   
Table 4.26 shows the projected income statement from 2016 to 2020.  Farm Credit 
Illinois is projected to have negative net income four out of the five years.  The negative net 
income results in the decreasing earned surplus as shown in Table 4.27.  Farm Credit Illinois 
pays zero patronage again in this scenario because they have not used a patronage program 
historically. 
Table 4.28 shows the projected balance sheets over the five-year period.   Loan volume is 
projected to grow slightly over the five-year horizon.  The slight growth in addition to the 
decline in equity causes stress to the association’s regulatory capital ratios.   Table 4.29 
summarize the impact of a farm crisis on Farm Credit Illinois' capital ratios under both capital 




growth causes all capital ratios to decrease.  The increase in risk-weights for nonaccrual loans 
causes the current capital ratios to deteriorate quicker than the prior capital ratios.  In this 1980’s 
credit stress scenario, Farm Credit Illinois would breach the regulatory minimum capital 
standards under the current capital standards but not the prior capital standards.  The current 
capital standard’s PCR is the ratio the falls below its regulatory minimum capital standard. 
 
4.7   Summary 
 
The APM provides a standardized approach to make comparisons of the risk profile 
between associations and the relative safety and soundness of the alternative capital standards.  
The two stress tests provide a way to demonstrate the utility of the APM and measure the capital 
adequacy of associations.  The two reverse stress tests also provide measures of associations’ 
capital adequacy and the safety and soundness of alternative capital standards.  Overall, the 
methodology utilized is this study provides FCS institutions, FCA, and the Public at large a 
fundamental understanding of the risk profile of individual associations in the AgriBank, the 






4.8   Tables and Figures 
 
Table 4.1 Key Risk Factors’ Historical Calculation 
 




ΔGLI The difference of GLIt and GLIt-1 divided by GLIt-1 
Nonaccrual 
Loans / Total 
Loans 
%NonAcc 
(Nonaccrual loans)t  divided by the difference of GLIt 
and (accrued interest receivable)t 
ALL / Gross 
Loans 
%ALL ALL t divided by GLI t 
Net Charge-offs 
/ Gross Loans 
%NCO 
(Charge-offs) t subtracted by (loan loss recoveries)t 
then is divided by the difference between the average 
of GLIt,t-1 and average of (accrued interest receivable)t,t-
1 
% Change in 
Total NIE 




(Loans and leases interest income)t divided by the 
summation of (accrual loans and leases)t,t-1, (notes 
receivable from other FCS Institutions)t,t-1, (other notes 
receivable)t,t-1, and (accrual sales contracts)t,t-1 divided 
by 2 
Avg. Cost of 
Debt 
CofD 
(total interest expense)t divided by the average of 
















Table 4.2 Key Risk Factors’ Projection Calculations 
 
Stress Variables Description of Calculation 
Gross Loan Items Growth 
Rate 
Projected percentile of stress for period t 
Nonaccrual Loans / Total 
Loans 
Projected percentile of stress for period t of years 
greater than 2003 
Avg. Cost of Debt Basis point change from last historical year 
Percentage Change in Total 
NIE 
Projected percentile of stress for period t 
ALL / Gross Loans Projected percentile of stress for period t 
Net Chargeoffs /Gross Loans Projected percentile of stress for period t 
































Table 4.3 APM’s Additional Assumptions on Patronage Payment, Extraordinary Items, and Tax 
Rate 
 
Assumption Variable Set Projection Calculation 
Extraordinary Items Average of extraordinary items for period t-1 and t-2 
Net Other Comprehensive 
Income 
Average of net other comprehensive income for period t-1  
and t-2 
Patronage as percentage of 
Comprehensive Income 
Average of patronage as percentage of comprehensive 
income for period t-1 and t-2 
Percentage of 
Comprehensive Income as 
Patronage 
Average of percentage of comprehensive income as 
patronage for period t-1 and t-2 
Patronage Paid 
If (net income) t / avg.(assetst,t-1) is less than patronage paid is 
less than (maximum available patronage)t , zero, otherwise 
(comprehensive income)t * (patronage as a percentage of 
comprehensive income)t 
Patronage Paid in Cash 
If (net income)t dived by avg.(assets t,t-1) is less than 
patronage paid as a percentage of comprehensive income, 
zero, otherwise comprehensive income * (percentage of 
comprehensive income as patronage)t 
Maximum Available 
Patronage 
Set at one percent 


















Table 4.4 Projected Assets at Period t 
 
Assets Projection Calculation 
Cash Casht-1 divided by GLIt-1 multiplied by GLIt 
Marketable Investments (Marketable investments) t-1 divided by GLIt-1 multiplied by GLIt 
Accounts Receivable (Accounts receivable) t-1 divided by GLIt-1 multiplied by GLIt 
Accrual Loans 
GLIt minus the summation of (nonaccrual loans)t  and (total 
accrued interest receivable)t 
Nonaccrual Loans 
If (nonaccrual loans)t-1 multiplied by (nonaccrual adjustment)t is 
greater than (%NonAcc) multiplied by GLIt subtracted by (total 
accrued interest receivable)t, (Nonaccrual Loans)t-1 multiplied by ( 
Nonaccrual Adjustment)t, else (%NonAcc) multiplied by GLIt 
subtracted by (total accrued interest receivable)t 
Allowance for Loan 
Losses 
Summation of (accrual loans)t, (nonaccrual Loans)t, Summation of 
(accrual loans)t-1, and (nonaccrual Loans)t-1 divided by 2, 
multiplied by %ALL than subtracted by (provisions for loans, sales 
contracts, notes and leases)t 
Net Loans (Accrual loans)t plus (nonaccrual loans)t subtracted by (ALL)t   
Total Accrued 
Interest Receivable 
(Total accrued interest receivable)t-1 divided by GLIt-1 multiplied 
by GLIt 
Equity Investments in 
Other FC Institutions 
Summation of (notes payable to other FCS institutions)t and GLIt is 
multiplied by (equity investments in other FCS institutions)t-1 
divided by (notes payable to other FCS institutions)t-1 
Fixed Assets (Fixed assets)t-1 divided by GLIt-1 multiplied by GLIt 
Other Assets (Other Assets)t-1 divided by GLIt-1 multiplied by GLIt 
Total Assets 
Summation of casht, (marketable investments)t, (accounts 
receivable)t, (net loans)t, (total accrued interest receivable)t, (equity 
investments in other FCS institutions)t, (fixed assets)t and (other 








Table 4.5 Projected Liabilities at Period t 
 
Liabilities Calculation Description 
System Wide Notes & Bonds 
(System wide notes & bonds)t-1 divided by (total 
assets)t-1 multiplied by (total assets)t 
Notes Payable to Other FCS 
Institutions 
(Total assets)t subtracted by the summation of 
(total equity)t, (total accrued interest payable)t, 
(total other liabilities)t, (system notes & bonds)t, 
and (other debt)t 
Other Debt 
(Other debt)t-1 divided by (total assets)t-1 
multiplied by (total assets)t 
Accrued Interest Payable On:  
System wide Notes and Bonds 
(system wide notes & bonds)t-1 divided by (total 
assets)t-1 multiplied by (total assets)t 
Notes Payable to Other FCS 
Institutions 
Summation of (notes payable to other FCS 
institutions)t and GLIt multiplied by the quotient 
of (accrued interest payable on notes payable to 
other FCS institutions)t divided by (Notes payable 
to other Financial institutions)t plus the difference 
in GLIt -GLIt-1 
Other Debt 
(Other Debt)t-1 divided by GLIt-1 multiplied by 
GLIt 
Total Other Liabilities 
(Total Other Liabilities) t-1 divided by GLIt-1 and 
multiplied by GLIt 
Total Liabilities 
Summation of (total accrued interest payable)t, 
















Table 4.6 Projected Equity at Period t 
 
Equity Calculation Description 
Capital Stock 
(Capital stock)t-1 divided by the summation of 
(accrual loans)t-1 and (nonaccrual loans)t-1, 
multiplied by the summation of (accrual loans)t and 
(nonaccrual loans)t 
Earned Surplus 
(Earned surplus)t-1 plus (comprehensive income)t 
less (patronage paid in cash)t 
Accumulated Other 
Comprehensive Income 
(Accumulated other comprehensive income)t plus 
(Comprehensive income)t less (net income)t 
Total Equity 
Summation of (capital stock)t, (earned surplus)t, and 
(accumulated other comprehensive income)t 
Total Liabilities and 
Equity 





Table 4.7 Projected Income Statement for Period t 
 
Interest Income: Calculation 
Loans and Leases LoanRatet multiplied by average of (accrual loans)t and (accrual loans)t-1 
Total Other Interest 
(Total other interest)t-1 divided by (loans and lease interest income)t-1 multiplied 
by (interest income from loans and leases)t 
Total Interest Income (Loans and leases)t plus (total other interest income)t 
Total Interest 
Expense 
CofDt multiplied by (notes payable to other FCS institutions)t-1 plus if the 
summation of (accrual loans)t and (nonaccrual loans)t, subtracted by (accrual 
loans)t-1 and (nonaccrual loans)t-1 is less than zero, 0, else the summation of 
(accrual loans)t-1 and (nonaccrual loans)t-1 subtracted by (accrual loans)t and 
(nonaccrual loans)t divided by 2 
Net Interest Income (Total interest income)t subtracted by (total interest expenses)t 
Net Interest Income 
(after Provision) 
(Net interest income)t subtracted by (provisions for loss)t 
Total Non-Interest 
Income 
(Total non-interest income) divided by the average of (total assets)t-1 and (total 
assets)t-2 multiplied by the(total assets)t and (total assets)t-1 
Total Non-Interest 
Expense 
(Total non-interest expense)t multiplied by (1 plus ΔNIEt) 
Income Before Taxes 
and Extraordinary 
Items 
Summation of (total interest income)t and (Non-interest income)t subtracted by 
the summation of (non-interest expense)t and (interest expense)t 
Taxes 
If (net income)t is less than zero taxes are zero, else (net income)t multiplied by 
0.06 
Net Income Before 
Extraordinary Items 
(Income before taxes and extraordinary items)t subtracted by (taxes)t 
Extraordinary Items 
and Other Adjustments 
zero 
Net Income 
(Net income before extraordinary items)t subtracted by (extraordinary items 
and other adjustments)t 
Comprehensive 
Income 
(Net income)t subtracted by (net other comprehensive income)t 
Management Decision Calculation 
Patronage Paid 
If (net income)t divided by Average (total assets)t,t-1 is less than patronage paid 
is less than (maximum available patronage)t, zero, otherwise (comprehensive 
income)t multiplied by (patronage as a percentage of comprehensive income)t 
Patronage Paid in Cash 
If (net income)t dived by Average(total assets)t,t-1 is less than patronage paid as a 
percentage of comprehensive, zero, otherwise comprehensive income multiplied 






Table 4.8 Prior and Current Capital Category Projection Calculations 
 
Numerators:
   Core Surplus
(Earned Surplus)t subtracted by (Equity Investment in 
Other FCS Institutions)t
   Total Surplus
Average of (Total Surplus divided by Equity)t-1,t-2 
multiplied by (Equity)t
   Permanent Capital (Total Surplus)t + (Cooperative Stock)t
   Common Equity Tier 1 Capital
Average of (Common Equity Tier 1 Capital divided by 
Equity)t-1,t-2 multiplied by (Equity)t
   Tier 1 Capital
Average of (Tier 1 Capital divided by Equity)t-1,t-2 
multiplied by (Equity)t
   Total Capital
(Tier 1 Capital divided by Equity)t-1,t-2 multiplied by 






Table 4.9 Farm Credit Illinois’ Capital Ratios, 2011-2015 
 
Capital Standard 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Common Equity Tier 1 Ratio 14.91% 14.49% 15.68% 16.61% 16.38% 
New Permanent Capital Ratio 14.91% 14.49% 15.68% 16.60% 16.38% 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio 14.91% 14.49% 15.68% 16.61% 16.38% 
Total Capital Ratio 15.05% 14.60% 15.79% 16.74% 16.52% 
Leverage Ratio 15.73% 15.18% 16.49% 17.22% 16.92% 
Core Surplus Ratio1 14.85% 14.43% 15.67% 16.62% 16.41% 
Total Surplus Ratio1 14.85% 14.43% 15.67% 16.62% 16.41% 
Permanent Capital Ratio1 15.12% 14.67% 15.91% 16.84% 16.61% 













Table 4.10 Loan Growth Stress Test Scenario Assumptions 
 
Key Risk Factors 2016 2017 2018 2019 2019
 Gross Loan Items Growth Rate 90% 90% 90% 90% 90%
Nonaccrual Loans/Total Loans 50% 50% 50% 50% 50%
ALL/Gross Loans 50% 50% 50% 50% 50%
Net Chargeoffs/Gross Loans 50% 50% 50% 50% 50%
% Change in Total NIE 50% 50% 50% 50% 50%
Avg. Cost of Debt1 + 0 bps + 0 bps + 0 bps + 0 bps + 0 bps
Avg. Loan Interest Rate1 - 100 bps - 100 bps - 100 bps - 100 bps - 100 bps
1 Projection uses the 2015 level +/- the basis points change shown in the corresponding years cell
Percentile Lookup and Scenario Generator Utility
 
 
Table 4.11 Credit Quality Stress Test Scenario Assumptions 
 
Key Risk Factors 2016 2017 2018 2019 2019
 Gross Loan Items Growth Rate 50% 50% 50% 50% 50%
Nonaccrual Loans/Total Loans 95% 95% 95% 95% 95%
ALL/Gross Loans 95% 95% 95% 95% 95%
Net Chargeoffs/Gross Loans 95% 95% 95% 95% 95%
% Change in Total NIE 50% 50% 50% 50% 50%
Avg. Cost of Debt1 + 100 bps + 100 bps + 100 bps + 100 bps + 100 bps
Avg. Loan Interest Rate1 + 0 bps + 0 bps + 0 bps + 0 bps + 0 bps
1 Projection uses the 2015 level +/- the basis points change shown in the corresponding years cell
Percentile Lookup and Scenario Generator Utility
 
 
Table 4.12 Credit Quality Reverse Stress Test Scenario Assumptions 
 
Key Risk Factors 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
 Gross Loan Items Growth Rate 90% 90% 90% 90% 90%
Nonaccrual Loans/Total Loans2 * * * * *
ALL/Gross Loans2 * * * * *
Net Chargeoffs/Gross Loans2 * * * * *
% Change in Total NIE 50% 50% 50% 50% 50%
Avg. Cost of Debt1 + 0 bps + 0 bps + 0 bps + 0 bps + 0 bps
Avg. Loan Interest Rate1 - 100 bps - 100 bps - 100 bps - 100 bps - 100 bps
1 Projection uses the 2015 level +/- the basis points change shown in the corresponding years cell
Percentile Lookup and Scenario Generator Utility
2 Reverse stress test value is calculated by multiplying the 50% percentile of stress by the value 






Table 4.13 Loan Growth Reverse Stress Test Scenario Assumptions 
Key Risk Factors 2016 2017 2018 2019 2019
 Gross Loan Items Growth Rate2 * * * * *
Nonaccrual Loans/Total Loans 95% 95% 95% 95% 95%
ALL/Gross Loans 95% 95% 95% 95% 95%
Net Chargeoffs/Gross Loans 95% 95% 95% 95% 95%
% Change in Total NIE 50% 50% 50% 50% 50%
Avg. Cost of Debt1 + 100 bps + 100 bps + 100 bps + 100 bps + 100 bps
Avg. Loan Interest Rate1 + 0 bps + 0 bps + 0 bps + 0 bps + 0 bps
1 Projection uses the 2015 level +/- the basis points change shown in the corresponding years cell
Percentile Lookup and Scenario Generator Utility
2 Reverse stress test value is the 50% multiplied by the value needed to hit the chosen regulatory 
minimum value at year-end 2020  
Table 4.14 Farm Credit Illinois’ Assets, 2012-2015 (000’s) 
 
Assets 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Cash $0 $0 $0 $0 
Marketable Investments $0 $0 $0 $0 
Accounts Receivable $7,409 $8,875 $8,282 $7,058 
Loans, Notes, Sales Contracts and Leases: 
    
Accrual Loans $3,158,944 $3,175,403 $3,419,852 $3,818,797 
Nonaccrual Loans $1,312 $814 $5,050 $5,657 
Allowance for Loan Losses ($3,764) ($3,585) ($4,833) ($5,489) 
Net Loans $3,156,492 $3,172,632 $3,420,069 $3,818,965      
Accrued Interest Receivable: 
    
Loans and Leases $31,865 $33,584 $36,582 $40,898 
Notes Receivable from other FCS Institutions $0 $0 $0 $0 
Other Notes Receivable $0 $0 $0 $0 
Sales Contracts $0 $0 $0 $0 
Marketable Investments $0 $0 $0 $0 
Total Accrued Interest Receivable $31,865 $33,584 $36,582 $40,898      
Equity Investments in Other FC Institutions $90,092 $104,766 $99,311 $102,554 
Other Property Owned $0 $0 $0 $0 
Fixed Assets $16,071 $16,760 $18,204 $18,493 
Other Assets $2,170 $1,817 $2,738 $2,672 
Total Other Assets $25,650 $27,452 $29,224 $28,223 







Table 4.15 Farm Credit Illinois’ Liabilities, 2012-2015 (000’s) 
 
Liabilities 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Interest Bearing Liabilities:     
System wide Notes/Bonds $0 $0 $0 $0 
Notes Payable to Other FCS Institutions $2,695,585 $2,663,678 $2,847,641 $3,190,061 
Other Debt $0 $0 $0 $0 
Total Interest-Bearing Liabilities $2,695,585 $2,663,678 $2,847,641 $3,190,843      
Accrued Interest Payable On: 
    
System wide Notes and Bonds $0 $0 $0 $0 
Notes Payable to Other FCS Institutions $8,273 $8,173 $8,925 $10,421 
Other Debt $0 $0 $0 $0 
Total Accrued Interest Payable $8,273 $8,173 $8,925 $10,421 
Other Liabilities: 
    
Accounts Payable $4,669 $6,761 $7,710 $8,521 
Other Liabilities $4,046 $4,559 $4,438 $3,253 
Total Other Liabilities $8,715 $11,320 $12,148 $11,774 
Total Liabilities $2,712,573 $2,683,171 $2,868,714 $3,213,038 
 
Table 4.16 Farm Credit Illinois’ Equity, 2012-2015 (000’s) 
 
Equity 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Capital Stock $8,245 $8,263 $8,326 $8,311 
Earned Surplus $583,281 $647,000 $708,146 $769,291 
Accumulated Other 
Comprehensive Income 
$0 $0 $0 $0 
Total Equity $591,526 $655,263 $716,472 $777,602 













Table 4.17 Farm Credit Illinois’ Income Statement, 2012-2015 (000’s) 
 
Income Statement 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Interest Income:     
Loans and Leases $105,414 $110,720 $112,173 $123,059 
Other $6 $1,577 $1 ($1) 
Total Other Interest $6 $1,577 $1 ($1) 
Total Interest Income $105,420 $112,297 $112,174 $123,058 
Interest Expense:     
System wide Notes/Bonds $0 $0 $0 $0 
Notes Payable to other FCS Institutions $32,586 $32,180 $33,252 $38,761 
Other Debt $0 $0 $0 $0 
Total Interest Expense $32,586 $32,180 $33,252 $38,761 
     
Net Interest Income $72,834 $80,117 $78,922 $84,297 
Provisions for Losses:     
Loans, Sales Contracts, Notes and Leases ($632) ($151) $1,511 $1,522 
Other Assets $0 $0 $0 $0 
Net Interest Income (after Provision) $73,466 $80,268 $77,411 $82,775 
Non-Interest Income:     
Patronage, Dividends, ect., from other FC 
Institutions 
$15,354 $16,582 $18,520 $16,376 
Operating  $9,092 $8,558 $9,843 $10,530 
Other $0 $0 $0 $0 
Total Non-Interest Income $24,446 $25,140 $28,363 $26,906 
Net Gains (Losses) $3,275 $755 ($145) ($144) 
Total Non-Interest Expense $35,536 $39,972 $42,936 $46,901 
Taxes $2,622 $2,472 $1,547 $1,491 
Extraordinary Items and Other 
Adjustments 
$0 $0 $0 $0 
Net Income $63,029 $63,719 $61,146 $61,145 
Patronage Paid $0 $0 $0 $0 
Patronage Paid in Cash $0 $0 $0 $0 
 
Table 4.18 GLI, URE, and URE as a Percentage of Equity, URE as a Percentage of Assets, 2012-
2015 (000’s) 
  
2012 2013 2014 2015 
Gross Loan Items` 3,192,121 3,209,801 3,461,484 3,865,352 
URE $583,281 $647,000 $708,146 $769,291 
URE / Equity 99% 99% 99% 99% 





Table 4.19 Farm Credit Illinois’ Historical Key Risk Factors (2012-2015) and Projected Key Risk Factors (2016-2020) 
 
 Historical Values Projected Values 
Assumption Variable Set 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
Gross Loan Items Growth Rate 16.36% 0.55% 7.84% 11.67% 9.31% 9.31% 9.31% 9.31% 9.31% 
Nonaccrual Loans / Total Loans 0.04% 0.03% 0.15% 0.15% 0.24% 0.24% 0.24% 0.24% 0.24% 
Avg. Cost of Debt 1.30% 1.20% 1.21% 1.28% 1.28% 1.28% 1.28% 1.28% 1.28% 
% Change in Total NIE 11.09% 12.48% 7.42% 9.23% 8.05% 8.05% 8.05% 8.05% 8.05% 
ALL / Gross Loans 0.12% 0.11% 0.14% 0.14% 0.20% 0.20% 0.20% 0.20% 0.20% 
Net Chargeoffs / Gross Loans -0.01% 0.00% 0.01% 0.02% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 




Table 4.20 Farm Credit Illinois’ Projected Income Statement, 2016-2020 (000’s) 
  
Income Statement 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
Interest Income:      
Loans and Leases $135,817 $148,390 $162,200 $177,295 $193,796 
Total Other Interest ($1) ($1) ($1) ($1) ($2) 
Total Interest Expense $43,244 $47,468 $51,974 $56,894 $62,268 
      
Net Interest Income $92,571 $100,921 $110,225 $120,400 $131,526 
Provisions for Losses:      
Loans, Sales Contracts, Notes and 
Leases 
$3,151 $1,123 $1,228 $1,342 $1,467 
Other Assets $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
Net Interest Income (after Provision) $89,420 $99,798 $108,998 $119,058 $130,060 
      
Total Non-Interest Income $29,691 $32,489 $35,529 $38,853 $42,489 
Net Gains (Losses) $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
Total Non-Interest Expense $50,678 $54,759 $59,168 $63,933 $69,081 
Taxes $4,106 $4,652 $5,121 $5,639 $6,208 
Extraordinary Items and Other 
Adjustments 
$0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
Net Income $64,328 $72,876 $80,236 $88,339 $97,259 
Patronage Paid $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
Patronage Paid in Cash $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
 




2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
Gross Loan Items` 4,225,085 4,618,297 5,048,104 5,517,912 6,031,442 
URE $833,303.35 $906,416 $986,574 $1,075,001 $1,172,249 
URE / Equity 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 










Table 4.22 Farm Credit Illinois’ Projected Assets, 2016-2020 (000’s) 
 
Assets: 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
Cash $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
Marketable Investments $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
Accounts Receivable $7,714.86 $8,432.85 $9,217.67 $10,075.52 $11,013.21 
Loans, Notes, Sales Contracts and Leases:    
Accrual Loans $4,170,287 $4,558,399 $4,982,632 $5,446,346 $5,953,216 
Nonaccrual Loans $10,094 $11,034 $12,060 $13,183 $14,410 
Allowance for Loan Losses ($8,321) ($9,095) ($9,942) ($10,867) ($11,879) 
Net Loans $4,172,060 $4,560,337 $4,984,750 $5,448,661 $5,955,747 
      
Total Accrued Interest 
Receivable 
$44,704 $48,865 $53,412 $58,383 $63,817 
Equity Investments in 
Other FC Institutions 
$114,119 $126,930 $141,155 $156,949 $174,488 
Other Property Owned $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
Fixed Assets $20,214 $22,095 $24,152 $26,399 $28,856 
Other Assets $2,921 $3,192 $3,490 $3,814 $4,169 
Total Other Assets $30,850 $33,721 $36,859 $40,289 $44,039 















Table 4.23 Farm Credit Illinois’ Projected Liabilities, 2016-2020 (000’s) 
Liabilities: 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
Interest-Bearing Liabilities:      
System wide Notes/Bonds $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
Notes Payable to Other FCS 
Institutions 
$3,502,475 $3,835,278 $4,198,723 $4,595,602 $5,028,993 
Other Debt $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
Total Interest-Bearing 
Liabilities 
$3,502,475 $3,835,278 $4,198,723 $4,595,602 $5,028,993 
Accrued Interest Payable On:      
System Wide Notes and 
Bonds 
$0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
Notes Payable to Other FCS 
Institutions 
$11,377 $12,486 $13,669 $14,963 $16,375 
Other Debt $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
Total Accrued Interest 
Payable 
$11,377 $12,486 $13,669 $14,963 $16,375 
Other Liabilities:      
Accounts Payable $9,330 $10,203 $11,158 $12,202 $13,343 
Other Liabilities $3,562 $3,895 $4,260 $4,658 $5,094 
Total Other Liabilities $12,892 $14,098 $15,417 $16,860 $18,437 
Total Liabilities $3,526,744 $3,861,861 $4,227,809 $4,627,424 $5,063,805 
 
Table 4.24: Farm Credit Illinois’ Projected Equity, 2016-2020 (000’s) 
Equity: 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
Capital Stock $9,084 $9,930 $10,854 $11,864 $12,968 




$0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
Total Equity $842,703 $916,425 $997,585 $1,086,935 $1,185,298 
Total Liabilities and 
Equity 




















Figure 4.2 Farm Credit Illinois’ RWA-to-Assets Ratio, 2007-2015 
 
 
Table 4.25 Farm Credit Illinois’ Historical (2014-2015) and Projected (2016-2020) Capital 
Ratios 
Capital Standard 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
Common Equity Tier 1 Ratio 16.61% 16.38% 16.10% 16.06% 15.96% 15.92% 15.86% 
New Permanent Capital Ratio 16.60% 16.38% 16.10% 16.06% 15.96% 15.91% 15.86% 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio 16.61% 16.38% 16.10% 16.06% 15.96% 15.92% 15.86% 
Total Capital Ratio 16.74% 16.52% 16.29% 16.24% 16.15% 16.10% 16.05% 
Leverage Ratio 17.22% 16.92% 16.68% 16.62% 16.53% 16.47% 16.42% 
Core Surplus Ratio* 16.62% 16.41% 16.14% 16.01% 15.87% 15.76% 15.66% 
Total Surplus Ratio* 16.62% 16.41% 16.14% 16.10% 16.00% 15.96% 15.90% 
Permanent Capital Ratio* 16.84% 16.61% 16.35% 16.30% 16.20% 16.16% 16.10% 

















Table 4.27 Farm Credit Illinois’ Projected Income Statements in the 1980’s Farm Crisis 
Scenario, 2016-2020 (000’s) 
 
 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
Interest Income:      
Loans and Leases $118,673 $127,534 $159,147 $193,509 $235,686 
Total Other Interest ($1) ($1) ($1) ($2) ($2) 
      
Interest Expense: $43,244 $47,895 $73,073 $103,263 $139,772 
      
Net Interest Income $75,428 $79,638 $86,073 $90,244 $95,912 
Provisions for Losses:      
Loans, Sales Contracts, 
Notes and Leases  
$102,311 $94,017 $178,370 $220,435 ($915) 
Net Interest Income  
(after Provision) 
($26,883) ($14,379) ($92,297) ($130,191) $96,828 
Non-Interest Income $29,409 $31,670 $33,916 $36,127 $39,124 
Total Non-Interest 
Expense 
$50,678 $54,759 $59,168 $63,933 $69,081 
Taxes $0 $0 $0 $0 $4,012 
Extraordinary Items and 
Other Adjustments 
$0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
Net Income ($48,152) ($37,467) ($117,550) ($157,997) $62,858 
Patronage Paid $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 





Key Risk Factors 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
 Gross Loan Items Growth 
Rate 
11.67% 9.31% 9.31% 8.25% 8.25% 8.25% 
Nonaccrual Loans/Total 
Loans 
0.15% 2.10% 3.50% 5.30% 6.80% 5.40% 
Avg. Cost of Debt 1.28% 1.28% 1.28% 1.78% 2.28% 2.78% 
% Change in Total NIE 9.23% 8.05% 8.05% 8.05% 8.05% 8.05% 
ALL/Gross Loans 0.14% 2.10% 3.50% 5.30% 6.80% 5.40% 
Net Charge-offs/Gross Loans 0.02% 0.50% 0.50% 1.60% 2.30% 0.90% 






Table 4.28 Farm Credit Illinois’ Balance Sheet in the 1980’s Farm Crisis Scenario, 2016-2020 
(000’s) 
 
 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
Assets: 
Cash $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
Marketable 
Investments 
$0  $0  $0  $0  $0  
Accounts Receivable $7,714.86  $8,432.85  $9,128.98  $9,882.56  $10,698.36  
Accrual Loans $4,092,593  $4,409,503  $4,684,463  $4,990,836  $5,483,982  
Nonaccrual Loans $87,788  $159,930  $262,172  $364,138  $313,039  
Allowance for Loan 
Losses 
($87,788) ($159,930) ($262,172) ($364,138) ($313,039) 
Net Loans $4,092,593  $4,409,503  $4,684,463  $4,990,836  $5,483,982  
Total Accrued 
Interest Receivable 
$44,704  $48,865  $52,898  $57,265  $61,992  
Equity Investments 
in Other FC 
Institutions 
$114,119  $126,810  $139,182  $152,488  $166,683  
Fixed Assets $20,214  $22,095  $23,919  $25,894  $28,031  
Other Assets $2,921  $3,192  $3,456  $3,741  $4,050  
Total Other Assets $30,850  $33,721  $36,504  $39,518  $42,780  
Total Assets $4,289,980  $4,627,331  $4,922,177  $5,249,989  $5,766,135  
           
Liabilities:           
Notes Payable to 
Other FCS 
Institutions 
$3,535,723  $3,907,485  $4,317,038  $4,799,579  $5,248,727  
           
Accrued Interest 
Payable On: 
          
Notes Payable to 
Other FCS 
Institutions 
$11,377  $12,592  $13,745  $15,159  $16,814  
           
Accounts Payable $9,160  $9,880  $10,510  $11,210  $12,312  
Other Liabilities $3,497  $3,772  $4,012  $4,280  $4,700  
Total Other 
Liabilities 
$12,657  $13,652  $14,522  $15,490  $17,012  
Total Liabilities $3,559,757  $3,933,729  $4,345,306  $4,830,227  $5,282,554  
           
Equity:           
Capital Stock $9,084  $9,930  $10,750  $11,637  $12,598  
Earned Surplus $721,139  $683,672  $566,122  $408,125  $470,983  
Total Equity $730,223  $693,601  $576,871  $419,762  $483,581  
Total Liabilities 
and Equity 





Table 4.29 Farm Credit Illinois’ Capital Ratios in the 1980’s Farm Crisis Scenario, 2016-2020 
*Prior Regulatory Capital Ratio 
 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
Common Equity Tier 1 
Ratio 16.38% 14.09% 12.35% 9.56% 6.47% 6.84% 
New Permanent Capital 
Ratio  16.38% 14.08% 12.35% 9.56% 6.47% 6.84% 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio 16.38% 14.09% 12.35% 9.56% 6.47% 6.84% 
Total Capital Ratio 16.52% 15.34% 13.60% 10.81% 7.72% 8.09% 
Leverage Ratio 16.92% 14.72% 12.99% 10.15% 6.93% 7.26% 
Core Surplus Ratio* 16.41% 13.87% 11.81% 8.51% 4.78% 5.18% 
Total Surplus Ratio* 16.41% 14.25% 12.58% 9.82% 6.71% 7.03% 




CHAPTER 5: DATA 
 
 
This chapter is divided into four sections.  First, the dataset used in the APM model is 
summarized.  Next, the market share of the FCS is reviewed to provide insight into the size of 
the FCS.  After that, key risks factors are reviewed.  This section then concludes by looking at 
the FCS’s capital structure and position.  Overall, this chapter will provide insight into the data 
set and the FCS. 
 
5.1   Consolidated Reporting System 
Association and System Bank financial information is reported in a standard format by 
the Farm Credit Administration on a quarterly basis in a framework similar to the required Call 
Reports for commercial banks in a structure referred to as the Consolidated Reporting System 
(CRS).  This study uses the CRS quarterly data from 2000 to 2015.  Associations that merged 
during these periods financials were consolidated for the periods before they merged.  The APM 
uses the consolidated historical financials to standardizes stress for the key risk factors at 
common percentiles of stress from associations’ histories. 
The CRS includes information that allows for historical balance sheets and income 
statements to be reconstructed.  Key financial ratios such as PCR, TSR, and CSR are reported in 
this data set.  Key components of these capital ratios calculations such as risk-weighted assets 
and investment in other FCS institutions are also included in the CRS. 
Loan volume is separated into several loan type categories such as real estate, production, 
and rural residential real estate.  This information is not separated into commodity types.  Loans 




formally restructured loans, nonaccrual - cash basis, and nonaccrual - other.  The amount of 
allowance for loan losses, charge-offs, and recoveries are also reported by loan type. 
 
5.2   FCS Market Share 
Associations can price loans competitively versus competitors due to the Federal Farm 
Credit Funding Corporation's ability to acquire low-interest rates on debt.  The cost of debt is 
influenced by the riskiness of the asset and the return on the risk-free asset used to price the 
asset.  The United States’ risk-free asset is assumed to be Treasuries.  The less risky an 
institution’s debt is perceived to be, the smaller the interest rate spread will be above Treasuries.  
Figure 5.1 shows the interest rate spreads between FCS Bonds and Treasuries using Federal 
Reserve Economic Data (FRED).  FCS bonds minus Treasures at the 1-month, 6-month, 3-year, 
10-year, and 30-year term to maturity are respectively referred to as the SP1M, SP6M, SP3Y, 
SP10Y, and SP30Y in Figure 5.1.  The FCS bonds’ narrow interest rate spreads over Treasuries 
are partially from an implicit government guarantee due to the FCS’s GSE status. 
    Figure 5.2 compares the yield spreads between the FCS 30-year Bond (FCS30), 10-year 
Treasury (CMT10), and corporations rated AAA and BAA.  These yields represent the cost of 
long-term debt for the different types of credit risk.  The Corporate Bond yields are the 
estimation of Bonds with a remaining maturity of 20 to 30 years that are not callable (FRED).  
Federal Farm Credit Funding Corporation reports the FCS debt yields.  The narrower spread 
between AAA and 10-year Treasury in comparison to the BAA and 10-year Treasury indicates 
that as credit quality improves the cost of debt decreases.  The spread between 30-year FCS 
bonds and estimated AAA bonds (FCS30-AAA) indicates the FCS’s credit quality is comparable 




 One of the unique differences between Farm Credit associations and commercial banks is 
that associations are unable to take deposits.  Commercial banks’ ability to take deposits 
provides them a low-cost, short-term funding source unavailable to associations.  Commercial 
banks’ ability to take deposits provides them an advantage acquiring short-term loans, and 
associations’ access to low-cost, long-term funding provides them an advantage acquiring long-
term loans.  Figure 5.3 and 5.4 respectively show the market share for U.S. agriculture real estate 
debt and U.S. agriculture non-real estate debt for commercial banks and the FCS.  Associations 
long-term debt competitive advantage provides support for the FCS possessing a larger market 
share than commercial banks for real estate debt.  For non-real estate loans, commercial banks 
lead in market share primarily due to commercial banks short-term cost of debt advantage. 
FCS association’s share of the FCS’s loan volume varies widely.  Figure 5.5 shows 
AgriBank District associations’ loan volume ranges from under fifty million dollars to over 
twenty billion dollars as of 12/31/2015.  The portion of loan volume for farmland, 
production/intermediate, and other loans compared to the entire loan portfolio varies widely by 
association.  Figure 5.6 shows the percentage each loan type by volume as a percentage of total 
loan volume for each AgriBank District association as of 12/31/2015.  Mandan and North 
Dakota have production/intermediate-term loans as their largest loan category.  Production loans 
may provide an opportunity to shrink balance sheet under adverse economic conditions. 
Several associations have a prominent share of other types of loans.  Associations such as 
AgCountry, AgStar, and Mandan have a noticeable share of their loan portfolio in other loans.  
On the other side of the spectrum, Progressive, Midsouth, and Delta have minimal loan volume 




systems to make originating loans to these areas profitable.  Progressive, Midsouth, and Delta 
regarding loan volume are smaller institutions in the AgriBank District. 
A second possible explanation is that some geographical areas provide a greater 
opportunity to make these other types of loans.  The territories of AgCountry, AgStar, and 
Mandan are contiguous indicating this could be just a geographical opportunity. 
Credit quality varies between major loan categories.  Figure 5.7 shows the FCS 
associations’ aggregate ALL by loan category over time.  Production/Intermediate-term loans and 
real estate mortgages have the largest two shares of ALL volume.  Figure 5.8 shows that other 
loans proportionally make up a larger share of ALL then production/Intermediate-term loans and 
real estate mortgages.  Another notable feature is the jump in ALL from 2008 to 2009 is 
concurrent with the housing crisis.  
Figure 5.9 displays the FCS associations’ aggregate charge-off volume.  During this 
period, charge-offs increased as ALL increased and vice-versa, providing support that these credit 
factors are positively correlated.  Figure 5.10 illustrates the proportional share of charge-offs 
over time. 
Associations’ geographical constraint on where they can originate loans makes 
diversifying their loan portfolios difficult.  Because of this, associations’ loan portfolios are 
concentrated in a few commodity groups causing individual loans within associations’ portfolios 
to be highly correlated. 
 
5.3   Key Risk Factors 
Financial institutions estimate the impact of macroeconomic scenarios outlined in 




capital measures.  However, all scenarios impact a group of key risk factors that directly impact 
the balance sheet and income statement.   All macroeconomic factors impact in some 
combination loan growth, credit quality, operating expenses, and interest rate spreads on loans.  
Consistent with these themes, variables that can be varied in the APM include: loan growth rate, 
average loan interest rate, cost of debt, change in non-interest expense, allowance for loan loss as 
a percentage of gross loans, net charge-offs as a percentage of gross loans, and nonaccrual loans 
as a percentage of gross loans. 
Figure 5.11 shows the gross loan item growth rate for five AgriBank District 
associations. These five associations include the two largest associations in the AgriBank 
District, Farm Credit Services of America and Farm Credit Mid-America.  The smallest 
association in the AgriBank District, Delta Agricultural Credit Association.  One association, in 
addition to Farm Credit Mid-America, that does not issue patronage, Farm Credit Illinois.  
Lastly, AgStar Financial, the only association that has a patronage program where they retire 
allocated equities. 
Delta's loan growth rate is more volatile in comparison to Farm Credit Services of 
America and Farm Credit Mid-America.  A possible explanation is that due to the size of Delta's 
loan portfolio, one large loan can cause their growth rate to increase sharply in a year. 
Figure 5.12 shows the cumulative density function (CDF) of the gross loan item growth 
rate for each of the five associations.  Delta’s loan growth rate is the most volatile of the five 
associations, again, because of the small geographical area and small loan volume.  For example, 
the 80th percentile loan growth rate for Farm Credit Mid-America’s is approximately 13%, while 




needing to have higher starting capital ratios compared to Farm Credit Mid-America to be the 
same probabilistic distance from a regulatory capital standard. 
Next, a credit quality indicator, nonaccrual loans as a percentage of total loans is 
examined.  Figure 5.13 shows the nonaccrual loan percentage over time for the same sample of 
associations.  Regional agricultural conditions and association underwriting standards influence 
differences in nonaccrual loan percentages between associations.  Farm Credit Illinois tends to 
have a low nonaccrual loan to total loans ratio.  Delta’s credit quality appears more volatile than 
the other four associations.  AgStar Financial Services and Farm Credit Mid-America tend to 
have a somewhat higher ratio in comparison to Farm Credit Illinois and Farm Credit Services of 
America. 
Figure 5.14 shows the CDF of the nonaccrual loans to total loans ratio for each the 
sample associations.  Delta and AgStar have the most volatile nonaccrual loans as a percent of 
total loans ratio and have the highest average.  The notable difference between the average and 
90th percentile of Farm Credit Illinois and AgStar illustrates the importance of standardizing 
stress across associations.  For example, a two percent nonaccrual as a percent of total loans 
would be about the 60th percentile of stress for AgStar, while it would be almost the 100th 
percentile of stress for Farm Credit Illinois. 
 Figure 5.15 shows the percentage the ten largest loans makeup of average assets as of 
12/31/2015.  The trend appears to be that smaller associations have a few loans that make up a 
relatively larger percentage of the loan portfolio, and as the size of an association in terms of 
assets increases, the top ten loans as a percentage of average assets decreases.  Increased 




loans as a percent of total loans.  Counterparty default risk can cause volatility in credit quality 
metrics for associations with fewer assets.  
Figure 5.16 and 5.17 respectively show non-interest expense percentage change over time 
and the CDF of the non-interest expense percentage change for each association.  Examining 
Figure 5.16, it appears that non-interest expense tends to increase year-over-year.  Figure 5.17 
shows that most of the associations’ CDFs are somewhat similar in shape and on average non-
interest expenses increased about nine percent per annum except Delta that on average non-
interest expense increased about five percent.  
Non-interest expenses comprise a larger proportion of net loans (total loans minus ALL) 
for small associations than for large associations.  Figure 5.18 shows the relationship between 
associations’ net loan volume and non-interest expense as a percent of net loans for all FCS 
associations.  Figure 5.18 indicates economies of scale can be realized as associations grow loan 
volume. 
Figure 5.19 and 5.20 respectively show the cost of debt over time and the CDF of the cost 
of debt for each association.  The cost of debt in figure 5.19 does not control for an association’s 
loan mix, or credit quality.  Without controlling any of these factors, it appears the cost of debt of 
associations is highly correlated with the differences coming from loan mix and credit quality 
differences.  Figure 5.20 shows the CDFs of the cost of debt for these associations are different, 
but the primary difference is the average of the distribution, again, because of loan mix and 
credit quality. 
Figure 5.21 and 5.22 respectively show the average loan interest rate over time and the 
CDF of the average loan interest rate for each association.  The average loan interest rates shown 




philosophy.  Farm Credit Illinois appears to have the lowest average loan interest rate over the 
period, possibly driven by having the best credit quality over this period and not having a 
patronage program.  Delta has a noticeably higher average loan interest rate, approximately 1% 
higher than the next closest association. 
 
5.4   FCS Association Capital Structure 
Figure 5.23 illustrates the aggregated FCS associations’ assets, GLI, capital-to-assets 
ratio, URE-to-assets ratio, and non-performing loans to GLI ratio.  From 2011-2015, GLI and 
assets have increased each year, and capital has increased as a percentage of assets.  At the same 
time, the credit quality of the associations’ loan portfolios improved as seen by the decrease in 
the percentage of nonperforming loans as a percentage of GLI.  
 The capital-to-assets ratio has averaged approximately 18% over the last five years.  URE 
comprises the largest share of capital averaging about 17% of assets illustrating the majority 
capital is comprised of URE. 
The capital-to-assets ratio does not convey how much capital there is relative to the risk 
of the portfolio.  Figure 5.24 shows the ratio of RWA-to-assets for associations in the AgriBank 
District as of 12/31/2015.  A lower ratio indicates lower perceived riskiness of assets relative to 
book value.  The current capital standard’s leverage ratio’s purpose is to limit the risk from 
underestimating the riskiness of assets, resulting in lower risk-weights and a lower RWA-to-
assets ratio.  In general, the AgriBank District associations’ RWA-to-assets ratio is somewhere 
between .9 and 1.1 with the one exception being Delta. 
For the leverage ratio to be binding to an association the RWA-to-assets ratio would need 




as the tier 1 capital ratio is approximately 0.67.  An association would have a leverage ratio of 
4% at the same time as a tier 1 capital ratio of 6% after applying the RWA-to-Assets ratio of 0.67 
to the assets [4/(100*0.67)=0.06].  With the current risk-weighting of assets, the leverage ratio is 
not binding to associations.  The result is that the leverage ratio does not directly impact 
AgriBank District associations because it will not be associations’ binding capital ratio under the 
current capital standards. 
 While the leverage ratio is non-binding to associations, it may be the binding capital ratio 
for System Banks.  Figure 5.25 displays the RWA-to-assets ratio for the current four System 
Banks from year-end 2000 to year-end 2015.  While associations in the AgriBank District RWA-
to-assets ratios tend to be within 0.9 and 1.1, the current four System Banks’ RWA-to-assets 
ratios have all been below 0.6 since 2000.  The impact of the leverage ratio at the System Bank 
level is not modeled in this thesis but could be modeled using the APM by applying a higher cost 
of debt for associations. 
Figure 5.26 shows FCS associations’ aggregate net income, return on assets, net interest 
margin, and return on equity from 2011 to 2015.  Associations’ aggregate net income decreased 
slightly in 2014 and 2015 from the record high in 2013.  Associations’ aggregate net interest 
margin and return on assets have remained constant.  Return on equity has decreased due to 
associations funding more loans with equity instead of distributing earnings back to the 
cooperative members.  
Associations have an ALL account to absorb expected losses and capital to absorb 
unexpected losses with a certain probability.  An association’s PCR can be an indicator of an 
association’s perceived riskiness of its loan portfolio using the assumption that all associations 




and PCR.  The scatter plot shown in Figure 5.27 plots every FCS association.  It appears that 
there is an inverse relationship between an association’s asset size and its PCR. Figure 5.27 
suggests having a larger asset base helps manage risk.  Increased asset volume can improve 























5.5 Tables and Figures 
 
 
Figure 5.1 FCS Bond to Treasury Interest Rate Spreads, 2001-2015 
 






(Center of Farmland Research, 2016) 
Figure 5.3 Agriculture Real Estate Debt Market Share by Lender Type, 1960-2015 
 
 
                                                                 (Center of Farmland Research, 2016) 








































Figure 5.11 Sample of Associations’ Gross Loan Items Growth Rates, 2001-2015 
 
 



















Figure 5.15 FCS Associations’ Aggregate Ten Largest Customers’ Loan Volume as a 
Percentage of Average Assets, 2015 
 
 














Figure 5.18 FCS Associations’ Non-interest expense as a Percentage of GLI, 2015 (000’s) 
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 CHAPTER 6: RESULTS  
 
 
Differences in safety and soundness implied by alternative capital standards are discussed 
in this chapter.  All 17 associations in the AgriBank District capital ratios remained above the 
regulatory minimums in both the loan growth stress scenario and credit stress scenario over the 
projected five-year horizon with only minor differences in resulting excess capital relative to 
required minimums.  High starting capital positions and favorable economic conditions in 
agriculture have enabled associations to build up their capital over the last few years, making it 
difficult to identify a probable scenario that will cause an association’s capital ratios to fall below 
minimum regulatory capital standards. 
In addition to direct comparisons of resulting capital ratios under stress, differences in the 
impacts of each key risk factor are measured relative to a base scenario, providing an indicator of 
the relative importance of each key risk factor.  While past research has focused on credit stress, 
the results identify that loan growth negatively affects capital ratios more than the other key risk 
factors. 
Reverse stress tests are also used to measure differences in safety and soundness between 
prior and current capital standards.  In general, the current standards require more capital for an 
association to remain the same probabilistic distance away from a minimum capital standard, and 
in that sense, tend to be slightly more conservative. 
 
6.1   Impact of Key Risk Factors 
 
 The seven key risk factors an association faces are GLI growth rate, nonaccrual loans as a 




percentage change, CofD, and LoanRate.  In this subsection, the relative impact of each of these 
key risk factors is illustrated in comparison to a base scenario by varying one key risk factor at a 
time.  The base scenario uses the GLI growth rate, NIE percentage change, and the three credit 
variables projected values set at the 50th percentile of their historic distribution for each 
association.  Average loan interest rate and cost of debt are both set at last year’s values.   
 The impact that each key risk factor exerts on each of the regulatory capital ratios is 
tested by varying one key risk factor at a time by setting it at its 90th percentile of historical stress 
for GLI growth rate, NIE percentage change, and the three credit variables.  In addition, the 
average loan interest rate is decreased by one percentage point, and the cost of debt is increased 
by one percentage point to analyze the effect of these two variables.  Table 6.1 summarizes the 
stress scenarios used to test the individual impact of each key risk factor. 
 Table 6.2 displays the impact of these stress scenarios on TSR at the end of the five-year 
projection.  The results demonstrate one of the APM’s unique features; the ability to replicate 
management’s discretionary decision to pay patronage.  The APM replicates management’s 
discretionary decision by if the return on assets is less than one percent, an association will not 
pay patronage that year.  If the decrease in income from an increase (decrease) in CofD 
(LoanRate) is less than what the patronage distribution would have been if distributed, the capital 
ratios would be higher relative to the base scenario.  The comparison between key risk factors is 
more noticeable for associations that do not distribute patronage, such as Farm Credit Illinois and 
Farm Credit Mid-America because they do not pay patronage which can obscure the impact of 
the key risk factors.   
Examining the non-patronage paying associations, Farm Credit Illinois, North Dakota, 




most stressful scenarios occur under increased loan growth, decreased average loan interest rate, 
and increased cost of debt.  The three credit variables and NIE percentage change are relatively 
less impactful on TSR.  Of the three credit key risk factors,  the net charge-offs as a percentage of 
loans is the most stressfull variable. 
 Interestingly, increasing credit stress is the most often cited scenario to stress capital 
ratios, yet it is the least stressful historically based on each key risk factor being tested 
separately.  Stresses associated with a “good” economic conditions, such as rapid loan growth, 
can cause the most significant decline in capital ratios.  
The results shown in Table 6.2 do not take into consideration any correlations between 
the key risk factors.  For example, the credit key risk factors are positively correlated.  As credit 
quality deteriorates, loans are charged-off, other loans begin not being paid on time and move to 
nonaccrual status, and associations increase the ALL account to prepare for the increased 
likelihood of losses.  The credit and loan growth scenarios directly test and allow for comparison 
of the stress scenarios by taking into consideration how each key risk factor is anticipated to 
behave in each scenario. 
 
6.2   Stress Scenarios’ Results 
 
 The credit quality stress scenario and loan growth stress scenario results are compared in 
this section.  Tables 4.10 and 4.11 respectively show the calibration of key risk factors for the 
loan growth and credit quality stress scenarios discussed in this section. 
Table 6.3 shows the impact of the credit stress scenario on each AgriBank District 
Association’s TSR each year.  Table 6.3 includes the last observed period, 2015, and the 




previous capital standards.  Except for Delta, all associations’ TSRs declined between two and 
six percentage points over the five-year period.  Delta’s TSR declined by 7.2 percentage points 
over the period indicating that Delta’s credit quality is relatively more volatile.  Despite 
associations’ experiencing severe credit stress in this scenario, all seventeen associations 
remained above the regulatory minimum TSR over the projected five-year period. This result 
indicates associations’ in the AgriBank District are well capitalized and are able to withstand 
prolonged periods of credit stress. 
 Table 6.4 shows the impact of the loan growth stress scenario on AgriBank District 
associations’ TSRs over the projected five-year period.  Associations’ TSRs declined by 3.5 
percentage points to 7.8 percentage points over the five-year period.  In general, the associations’ 
TSRs declined more in the loan growth stress scenario compared to the credit stress scenario, 
indicating rapid loan growth is more dilutive to capital ratios.  All seventeen associations’ TSRs 
remained above the regulatory minimum TSR for the entire five-year period.  The results of this 
stress test also provide support for associations in the AgriBank District are well capitalized and 
are able to withstand prolonged periods of stress from a variety of sources. 
The two stress tests demonstrate several key points.  First, The APM’s ability to apply 
stress variety of sources that provide a standardized measure of associations’ safety and 
soundness.  The results show that all associations in the AgriBank District are well capitalized 
and can withstand stress from a variety of sources for prolonged periods of time, however, there 
are slight differences between the level of safety and soundness of associations.  Additionally, 
contrasting the results of the loan growth stress scenario and the credit stress scenario highlights 
the relative stressfulness of loan growth.  Most of the associations’ TSR declined more in the 




loan growth has on capital ratios and the importance of accurately depicting loan growth when 
implementing a stress test regardless of the methodology used to stress associations.   
 
6.3   Reverse Stress Tests’ Results 
 
 Safety and soundness are estimated by comparing the difference in loan growth and 
credit quality needed to hit a minimum capital standard under both capital standards regimes.  
Reverse stress tests are conducted using both a credit reverse stress test scenario and a loan 
growth reverse stress test scenario.   
 The loan growth reverse stress test demonstrates how much GLI growth is needed for an 
association to hit the minimum TSR of 7% over five years.  Table 4.13 shows how the key risk 
factors’ level of stress are calibrated for this reverse stress test.  TSR is chosen as the limit for the 
reverse stress test because it is the most binding of the prior capital ratios for all but one 
association in the AgriBank District.  If another capital ratio falls below its regulatory minimum 
after five years, then that ratio is more binding than TSR, and the instance is also recorded.  Table 
6.5 summarizes which capital ratios are more binding than the TSR for the loan growth reverse 
stress test.  
Table 6.5 shows that for 15 of the 17 associations, the new PCR and TCR regulatory 
minimums are breached before TSR hits its regulatory minimum standard, providing evidence of 
a higher level of safety and soundness under the current capital standards.  Delta is the only 
association whose CSR is their binding regulatory capital ratio.  Associations that breach the new 
PCR capital standard and not the TCR have a higher ALL as a percentage of RWA.  In general, 
under a loan growth reverse stress test scenario, the current capital standards provide a slightly 




 Delta and FCS Financial are the two associations in which none of the current capital 
ratios fell below the minimum capital standard before TSR hit its regulatory minimum.  The 
reason for this result is that Delta and FCS Financial have a large percentage of their equity made 
up of cooperative stock.  The regulatory minimum cooperative stock is not included in TSR, but, 
it is included in all the current capital standards.  Delta requires above the regulatory minimum 
cooperative stock for operating loans that would not be included in the current capital ratios, 
except for the new PCR.  This study assumes all of Delta’s cooperative stock meets the 
requirements to be included in all of the current regulatory capital ratios. 
Table 6.6 summarizes the number of associations in which another capital ratio is more 
binding than TSR under the credit reverse stress test.  Again, TSR is used because it is the most 
binding of the prior capital ratios.  For reference, Table 4.12 shows how the key risk factors’ 
level of stress are calibrated for this reverse stress test.  For 16 of the 17 AgriBank District 
associations, the new PCR falls below its minimum standard before TSR hits its minimum capital 
standard providing evidence of a higher level of safety and soundness under the current capital 
standards.  Only seven associations’ TCR fell below its minimum capital standard before TSR 
hits its minimum capital standard.  Only Delta’s CSR is its binding ratio of the prior capital 
standards.   
Next, the level of stress needed to breach the capital ratio that is typically the most 
binding under both capital standards is examined.  Tables 6.7 to 6.10 respectively show the 
difference in the level of stress for GLI growth, and for each of the three credit metrics required 
to breach the minimum capital standard under both capital standard regimes.  For reference, the 




Table 6.7 shows the GLI growth rate per year for the five years that result in each 
association breaching the regulatory minimum TSR, regulatory minimum TCR, the difference in 
GLI growth between the two reverse stress tests, and the 90th percentile of stress to benchmark 
the stressfulness of the GLI growth rate.  In general, all of the associations’ GLI growth rates 
were above the 90th percentile of stress for the projected five years.  This is another indication of 
the extraordinary amount of stress required for an association to breach a minimal capital 
standard under either the current or prior capital standards.  
If the difference between the GLI growth with TSR as the target is greater than when TCR 
is the target, this implies it takes less stress to hit a regulatory minimum under the current 
regulatory capital standards. This implies the current capital standards provide slightly higher 
safety and soundness as it takes less stress to breach a minimal regulatory capital standard.  
Differences in GLI growth rate per year is usually between one to five percentage points except 
for Delta and FCS Financial, due to them benefiting from the inclusion of cooperative stock in 
all the current capital standards.  Except for Delta and FCS Financial, the current regulatory 
capital ratios are more restrictive, or, require more capital to remain the same probabilistic 
distance from a minimum capital standard under the current capital ratios.  Both Delta and FCS 
Financial have a larger share of their equity comprised of cooperative stock compared to the 
other AgriBank District associations which causes the current capital standards to become 
slightly less restrictive. 
Tables 6.8 to 6.10 show the same information as Table 6.7, but for the three credit key 
risk factors.  Instead of comparing reverse stress test results of TSR and TCR, Tables 6.8 to 6.10 
compare the TSR to the new PCR.  The new PCR is chosen for the target because it is typically 




All seventeen associations nonaccrual loans as a percentage of GLI and ALL as a 
percentage of GLI are well above the 90th percentile of their historical stress over the projected 
five years to hit a minimal capital standard under either of the alternative capital standards due to 
the strong starting financial positions.  Both NonAccr% and ALL% are typically double the 90th 
percentile for the entire five-year period.  The NCO% varies by association considerably relative 
to the 90th percentile of stress because of how the credit factors are reverse stress tested.  The 
credit factors are reverse stress tested by multiplying the 50th percentile for the three credit 
factors simultaneously until an association hit the target minimal capital standard at the end of 
the five-year period.  Most associations’ 50th percentile of stress of NCO% is approximately 0%, 
for example, Farm Credit Illinois’ 50th percentile of stress of NCO% is 0.01%.  Overall, the 
credit stress needed for an association to breach a regulatory minimum capital standard under 
both capital standards regimes would require historic levels of stress for a prolonged period of 
time. 
The reverse stress tests conducted provide insights into several points.  First, the current 
capital standards provide a higher level of safety and soundness than the prior capital standards.  
In a credit stress situation, the PCR is generally the most binding capital ratio.  In a loan growth 
stress situation, the TCR is the most binding capital ratio.  Secondly, the reverse stress tests have 
provided more evidence that associations in the AgriBank District are well capitalized and can 
withstand stress from a variety of sources for a prolonged period of time. 
 
6.4   Implications and Possible FCS Responses 
 
The stress tests and reverse stress tests results demonstrated differences in safety and 




more capital for an association to remain the same probabilistic distance away from a minimum 
capital standard, and in that sense, tend to be slightly more conservative.  If associations intend 
to remain the same probabilistic distance from a critical point, such as a minimum capital 
standard, adjustments to their financial positions are necessary.  Associations can increase their 
capital ratios several ways including: shrinking their balance sheets, building up capital through 
increasing retained earnings, issuing third-party capital, or requiring a higher cooperative stock 
investment by borrowers. 
Associations have several options to shrink their balance sheets including selling 
participations or selling asset pools to System Banks.  A participation is a portion of a loan 
purchased or sold.  Selling participations would be the quickest way to increase capital ratios via 
shrinking the denominator.  For associations in the AgriBank District, another option is to utilize 
the shared asset pool.  Like a participation, an association sells a portion of a loan to AgriBank 
but must increase their investment in AgriBank as a percentage of the contributed asset pool loan 
volume.  The additional investment lowers the association’s capital ratios slightly more than a 
participation; however, this is offset by the earnings from asset pool being paid in patronage to 
associations at AgriBank’s Board of Directors discretion.  Historically, AgriBank’s Board of 
Directors has distributed 100% of the earnings from the Asset Pool. 
Another option to increase capital ratios is through increasing retained earnings.  Using 
earnings to improve capital ratios takes time, but does not require substantial changes to an 
association’s strategy.  Associations can increase earnings by increasing loan interest rates, 
although, possibly at the risk of losing market share.  Associations can also increase the retained 




A third strategy to increase capital ratios is to issue preferred stock or subordinated debt 
as both are included in association’s PCR and TCR, the binding ratios under the current capital 
standards.  This strategy is a quick method to increase an association’s PCR and TCR.  The 
disadvantage to this strategy is both these sources of funding are more expensive than an 
association’s direct note, resulting in lower earnings after patronage distributions to build up 
capital ratios going forward. 
A fourth strategy is to require higher cooperative stock investment by borrowers.  The 
implication of this requirement would be that capital will increase and decreased depending on 
loan volume.  Excess borrower stock must meet certain retirement standards to be included in the 
current capital ratios, so this strategy could also be unpopular.  This strategy would help 
minimize the dilutive impact of loan growth by borrowers capitalizing their loans by purchasing 
cooperative stock. 
In summary, there are multiple methods associations can utilize to increase their capital 
levels under stress.  Currently, at the current capital levels of associations, the need of these 
strategies is not necessary in the near term.  However, if capital levels were to decline, these 
strategies would likely be implemented by associations.  The APM does not model out any of 





6.5   Tables and Figures 
 
Table 6.1 Key Risk Factors’ Individual Stress Scenarios 
 
Key Risk Factors Base Scenario ΔGLI %NonAcc %ALL %NCO ΔNIE CofD LoanRate
ΔGLI 50% 90% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50%
%NonAcc 50% 50% 90% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50%
%ALL 50% 50% 50% 90% 50% 50% 50% 50%
%NCO 50% 50% 50% 50% 90% 50% 50% 50%
ΔNIE 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 90% 50% 50%
CofD + 0 bps + 0 bps + 0 bps + 0 bps + 0 bps + 0 bps + 100 bps + 0 bps

















ΔGLI %NonAcc %ALL %NCO ΔNIE CofD LoanRate 
GreenStone 12.8% 8.3% 12.8% 12.7% 12.3% 12.4% 13.5% 13.0% 
AgStar 12.8% 11.0% 12.6% 12.6% 12.2% 12.1% 12.0% 11.6% 
FCS of North Dakota 15.4% 12.3% 15.3% 15.3% 15.2% 14.8% 12.9% 12.5% 
Delta 18.0% 11.5% 17.7% 17.9% 15.2% 16.9% 15.7% 15.2% 
FCS of Mandan 13.2% 11.4% 13.2% 13.1% 13.0% 12.8% 11.6% 12.0% 
Farm Credit Illinois 15.9% 12.6% 15.8% 15.8% 15.7% 14.9% 13.3% 12.8% 
FCS of America 14.6% 11.9% 14.5% 14.5% 14.2% 14.2% 12.7% 12.4% 
Farm Credit Midsouth 17.4% 12.4% 17.3% 17.2% 17.1% 16.4% 16.3% 16.0% 
FCS of Western Arkansas 17.3% 15.3% 17.2% 17.2% 16.9% 16.6% 16.3% 16.3% 
Badgerland 14.7% 12.6% 14.7% 14.6% 14.5% 14.3% 12.7% 12.9% 
AgHeritage 20.2% 16.2% 20.2% 20.2% 20.0% 19.4% 18.0% 17.5% 
Progressive 18.1% 12.8% 18.1% 18.1% 18.0% 17.7% 16.3% 16.0% 
AgCountry 15.5% 11.3% 15.4% 15.4% 15.1% 14.4% 13.4% 13.5% 
1st FCS 15.4% 10.9% 15.4% 15.4% 15.2% 14.3% 13.4% 13.0% 
United FCS 14.2% 13.0% 14.1% 14.1% 13.9% 13.5% 12.5% 12.1% 
FCS Financial 16.8% 12.9% 16.6% 16.5% 15.9% 16.2% 15.0% 14.5% 












Table 6.3 AgriBank Associations’ Projected TSR in the Credit Stress Scenario, 2016-2020 
 
Association 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
Change 
2015-2020 
GreenStone 15.8% 14.6% 13.6% 12.8% 12.0% 11.2% 4.6% 
AgStar 14.6% 13.2% 12.0% 11.1% 10.3% 9.5% 5.1% 
FCS of North Dakota 15.7% 14.9% 14.2% 13.6% 13.0% 12.5% 3.2% 
Delta 16.5% 14.5% 13.3% 11.9% 10.7% 9.3% 7.2% 
FCS of Mandan 14.8% 14.0% 13.5% 13.1% 12.6% 12.2% 2.6% 
Farm Credit Illinois 16.4% 15.3% 14.6% 13.9% 13.3% 12.7% 3.7% 
FCS of America 15.2% 14.5% 13.8% 13.2% 12.7% 12.4% 2.8% 
Farm Credit Midsouth 18.0% 17.0% 16.8% 16.3% 15.9% 15.6% 2.4% 
FCS of Western Arkansas 18.8% 17.7% 16.8% 16.0% 15.3% 14.7% 4.1% 
Badgerland 16.4% 15.2% 14.5% 13.8% 13.2% 12.6% 3.8% 
AgHeritage 19.6% 19.1% 18.5% 18.1% 17.7% 17.3% 2.3% 
Progressive 19.2% 18.1% 17.7% 17.1% 16.6% 16.1% 3.1% 
AgCountry 16.5% 15.5% 14.9% 14.2% 13.7% 13.2% 3.2% 
1st FCS 16.2% 15.3% 14.7% 14.1% 13.5% 13.0% 2.3% 
United FCS 15.1% 14.1% 13.4% 12.8% 12.1% 11.6% 3.5% 
FCS Financial 17.2% 15.7% 15.0% 14.2% 13.5% 12.8% 4.4% 













Table 6.4 AgriBank Associations’ Projected TSR in the Loan Growth Stress Scenario, 2016-
2020 
 
Association 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
Change  
2015-2020 
GreenStone 15.8% 13.6% 11.9% 10.6% 8.9% 8.0% 7.8% 
AgStar 14.6% 13.5% 12.2% 11.4% 10.7% 10.2% 4.4% 
FCS of North Dakota 15.7% 13.9% 12.5% 11.4% 10.5% 9.9% 5.8% 
Delta 16.5% 13.6% 12.2% 10.9% 10.1% 9.6% 6.9% 
FCS of Mandan 14.8% 13.6% 12.3% 11.1% 10.2% 9.7% 5.1% 
Farm Credit Illinois 16.4% 14.5% 13.0% 11.8% 10.8% 9.9% 6.5% 
FCS of America 15.2% 13.7% 12.5% 11.5% 10.7% 10.0% 5.2% 
Farm Credit Midsouth 18.0% 15.9% 14.5% 13.0% 11.8% 10.8% 7.2% 
FCS of Western Arkansas 18.8% 17.7% 16.6% 15.8% 15.1% 14.2% 3.5% 
Badgerland 16.4% 14.7% 13.4% 12.3% 11.3% 10.5% 5.9% 
AgHeritage 19.6% 18.2% 16.7% 15.6% 14.6% 13.8% 5.8% 
Progressive 19.2% 16.6% 14.9% 13.3% 12.1% 11.1% 8.1% 
AgCountry 16.5% 14.3% 12.6% 11.3% 10.2% 9.3% 7.2% 
1st FCS 16.2% 14.0% 12.3% 11.0% 9.9% 9.0% 7.2% 
United FCS 15.1% 13.9% 13.1% 12.3% 11.7% 11.1% 4.0% 
FCS Financial 17.2% 15.3% 14.0% 12.8% 11.9% 11.1% 6.1% 
Farm Credit Mid-America 16.6% 14.8% 13.3% 12.1% 10.9% 10.0% 6.6% 
 
 
Table 6.5 Count of the Ratios in the Loan Growth Reverse Stress Test that are more Binding 





Count more Binding than TSR 
(out of 17) 
New Permanent Capital 
Ratio 
7.00% 15 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio 6.00% 0 
Total Capital Ratio 8.00% 15 
Leverage Ratio 4.00% 0 
Core Surplus Ratio 3.50% 1 








Table 6.6 Count of the Ratios in the Credit Quality Reverse Stress Test that are more Binding 





Count more Binding than TSR  
(out of 17) 
New Permanent Capital 
Ratio 
7.00% 16 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio 6.00% 0 
Total Capital Ratio 8.00% 7 
Leverage Ratio 4.00% 0 
Core Surplus Ratio 3.50% 1 
Permanent Capital Ratio 7.00% 0 
 
 
Table 6.7 AgriBank Associations’ Difference Between Reverse Stress GLI Growth Rates 
 
Association TSR TCR Difference 90th Percentile 
GreenStone 22.36% 21.70% 0.65% 21.77% 
AgStar 22.72% 21.42% 1.30% 16.22% 
FCS of North Dakota 33.96% 29.21% 4.76% 19.58% 
Delta 20.28% 38.24% -17.96% 29.24% 
FCS of Mandan 25.08% 21.65% 3.43% 14.77% 
Farm Credit Illinois 28.10% 24.57% 3.52% 17.09% 
FCS of America 26.19% 23.45% 2.74% 15.90% 
Farm Credit Midsouth 28.40% 26.46% 1.95% 16.22% 
FCS of Western Arkansas 30.94% 29.86% 1.09% 10.87% 
Badgerland 28.03% 25.83% 2.20% 15.59% 
AgHeritage 38.08% 33.59% 4.48% 15.01% 
Progressive 32.33% 28.21% 4.13% 17.26% 
AgCountry 28.75% 25.89% 2.86% 19.83% 
1st FCS 28.85% 25.42% 3.43% 21.04% 
United FCS 25.38% 22.68% 2.71% 19.58% 
FCS Financial 24.16% 24.57% -0.41% 15.57% 
























Association TSR PCR Difference 
90th 
Percentile 
GreenStone 2.88% 2.85% 0.03% 2.06% 
AgStar 6.26% 5.88% 0.38% 3.53% 
FCS of North Dakota 5.77% 5.44% 0.33% 0.82% 
Delta 5.03% 6.63% -1.60% 2.86% 
FCS of Mandan 8.43% 7.90% 0.53% 0.77% 
Farm Credit Illinois 5.39% 5.09% 0.31% 1.26% 
FCS of America 6.49% 6.03% 0.46% 0.99% 
Farm Credit Midsouth 9.69% 9.02% 0.66% 3.53% 
FCS of Western Arkansas 13.37% 12.88% 0.49% 1.30% 
Badgerland 9.13% 8.70% 0.43% 1.48% 
AgHeritage 14.16% 13.47% 0.70% 0.65% 
Progressive 7.14% 6.84% 0.30% 0.60% 
AgCountry 5.93% 5.59% 0.34% 1.36% 
1st FCS 4.13% 3.84% 0.29% 1.12% 
United FCS 8.96% 8.57% 0.39% 0.82% 
FCS Financial 4.17% 4.12% 0.05% 1.93% 




Table 6.9 AgriBank Associations’ Differences Between Reverse Stress %ALL 
 
Association TSR PCR Difference 90th Percentile 
GreenStone 2.06% 2.03% 0.02% 0.87% 
AgStar 1.89% 1.78% 0.11% 0.78% 
FCS of North Dakota 3.18% 3.00% 0.18% 0.30% 
Delta 2.47% 3.26% -0.79% 0.87% 
FCS of Mandan 4.23% 3.96% 0.27% 0.38% 
Farm Credit Illinois 3.17% 2.99% 0.18% 0.29% 
FCS of America 3.58% 3.32% 0.25% 0.52% 
Farm Credit Midsouth 5.17% 4.81% 0.35% 0.60% 
FCS of Western Arkansas 5.90% 5.68% 0.22% 0.70% 
Badgerland 4.35% 4.15% 0.20% 0.50% 
AgHeritage 5.86% 5.57% 0.29% 0.24% 
Progressive 6.61% 6.33% 0.27% 0.16% 
AgCountry 3.17% 2.99% 0.18% 0.55% 
1st FCS 2.23% 2.07% 0.16% 0.40% 
United FCS 4.11% 3.93% 0.18% 0.36% 
FCS Financial 5.25% 5.19% 0.06% 1.09% 











Association TSR PCR Difference 90th Percentile 
GreenStone 0.25% 0.25% 0.00% 0.48% 
AgStar 0.56% 0.53% 0.03% 0.40% 
FCS of North Dakota 0.21% 0.19% 0.01% 0.07% 
Delta 0.52% 0.69% -0.17% 1.10% 
FCS of Mandan 0.19% 0.17% 0.01% 0.11% 
Farm Credit Illinois 0.18% 0.17% 0.01% 0.10% 
FCS of America 0.44% 0.41% 0.03% 0.19% 
Farm Credit Midsouth 0.10% 0.10% 0.01% 0.14% 
FCS of Western 
Arkansas 
0.54% 0.52% 0.02% 0.23% 
Badgerland 0.26% 0.25% 0.01% 0.10% 
AgHeritage 0.65% 0.62% 0.03% 0.10% 
Progressive -0.02% -0.02% 0.00% 0.03% 
AgCountry 0.27% 0.26% 0.02% 0.18% 
1st FCS 0.16% 0.15% 0.01% 0.08% 
United FCS 0.13% 0.13% 0.01% 0.10% 
FCS Financial 0.06% 0.06% 0.00% 0.33% 
Farm Credit Mid-
America 




CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
The current capital standards present an important issue for the future of the Farm Credit 
System.  Safety and soundness issues are reviewed critically by the regulator and the Public at 
large.  This study examines the implications of alternative capital standards on safety and 
soundness by conducting reverse stress tests on associations in the AgriBank District using the 
APM.  Differences in the alternative capital standards’ safety and soundness are measured by 
estimating the difference in the level of stress needed to hit a minimum capital standard.   
 The APM methodology used in this study to test safety and soundness provides an 
intuitive method for stress testing associations that standardizes stress measures across 
associations.  The APM standardizes stress at common percentiles of stress from associations’ 
histories using call report data from 2000 to 2015.  From an industry standpoint, this 
methodology would be useful for FCA to quickly access the risk profile and relative risk profile 
of associations, or an association to benchmark their risk profile to a subset of associations. 
This study first uses the APM to conduct a credit stress scenario and loan growth stress 
scenario on associations in the AgriBank District.  The two stress tests conducted illustrated 
several points.  First, the APM’s ability to create stress scenarios from a variety of sources to 
measure the safety and soundness of associations.  Second, associations in the AgriBank District 
are well capitalized and can withstand extended periods of severe stress.  Last, the stress tests 
highlight the importance of adequately projecting loan growth in a stress scenario as it can 
quickly dilute capital adequacy measures. 
The APM is a unique model that’s intuitive, flexible methodology can create 




demonstrations shown in Chapter 4 have highlighted the APM’s ability to conduct a variety of 
stress scenarios.  In addition to the stress test conducted in this study, the APM is able to stress 
associations’ financial performance over a one to five-year period, and conduct stress tests and 
reverse stress tests focusing non-interest expense and interest rate spread compression. 
For both stress scenarios conducted in section 6.2, all associations in the AgriBank 
District remain above all the minimum regulatory capital ratios under both capital standards 
regimes.  These results provide evidence that associations in the AgriBank District are well 
capitalized can withstand prolonged periods of stress from a variety of sources. 
Notably, the loan growth scenario, in general, was more stressful on capital ratios than 
the credit scenario.  Rapid loan growth is dilutive to capital ratios due to the denominator 
expanding before the earnings stream from the new loans can be added to earned surplus to 
rebuild equity.  This result highlights the importance of accurately depicting loan growth in a 
stress scenario as it can meaningfully impact the resulting capital adequacy measures.  The result 
is meaningful insight regardless of the methodology used to stress test an association. 
Next, safety and soundness measures were calculated by conducting two reverse stress 
tests.  The alternative capital standards’ safety and soundness measures are compared via the 
difference in stress needed for an association to hit a minimum capital standard.  The reverse 
stress tests provide an indicator of the degree of stress required for an association to hit a 
minimum capital standard and the relative safety and soundness of both capital standards.  
The level of credit stress or loan growth stress required for an association to breach a 
minimal capital standard tended to be above the 90th percentile for the five-year period.  




 Considering only the previous capital standards, the most constraining capital ratio is 
typically the TSR.  The PCR is never the first capital ratio to be breached because the PCR 
includes cooperative stock making it always slightly higher than the TSR. 
The binding regulatory capital standard under the current standards is the TCR or the 
PCR.  In a loan growth stress situation, the TCR is the binding capital ratio, but in a credit stress 
scenario, it is the new PCR that binds the typical association.  The TCR allows for the addition of 
allowance for loan losses up to 1.25% of RWA to be added to the numerator.  In a credit stress 
scenario, allowance for loan losses increases making the TCR relatively less binding than the 
PCR as credit stress increases. 
The current capital standards are more binding than the prior capital standards because of 
the higher risk-weights on assets under the current capital standards.  The current regulatory 
capital ratios benefit from cooperative stock being added to all the ratios’ numerators but not 
enough to offset the higher risk-weights on nonaccrual loans and short-term commitments.  The 
credit reverse stress test shows that the median nonaccrual to total loans ratio needs to be 0.34% 
higher for the entire five-year period to breach the prior minimal capital standards in comparison 
to the current minimum capital standards.   
 For an association to be the same probabilistic distance from the current minimum capital 
standards as the prior minimum capital standards, associations must individually or with 
concurrence with other FCS entities adjust their balance sheet size, mixture of funding sources, 
or loan portfolio composition.  The findings support the current capital standards provide a 
higher level of safety and soundness in general, but most associations hold capital far in excess 




Overall, the study has provided a demonstration of a useful stress testing model, 
awareness of the capital adequacy of AgriBank District associations, and insight into the 
congruency between the two alternative capital standards.  The analysis has illustrated the utility 
of the APM to provide standardized comparisons of the risk profile of associations.  The APM 
would be useful for FCA to quickly access the risk profile and relative risk profile of 
associations, or an association to benchmark their risk profile to a subset of associations. The 
study has also shown AgriBank District associations are incredibly well capitalized due to not 
hitting a minimal capital standard under both capital regimes without experiencing extraordinary 
stress well above levels seen over the previous 16 years.  Additionally, the analysis of the 
alternative capital standards on safety and soundness has provided a benchmark for the level of 
safety and soundness of the alternative capital standards.  Overall, the current capital standards 
provide a slightly higher lever of safety and soundness, however, the current capital positions of 
AgriBank Associations make neither of the alternative capital standards particularly binding in 







Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. (2011, June). Basel III: A global regulatory 
framework for more resilient banks and banking system. Bank of International Settlements. 
Retrieved from Bank of International Settlements: http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf 
Archaryaa, V., Engle, R., & Pierret, D. (2013). Testing Macroprudential Stress Tests: The 
Risk of Regulatory Risk Weights. New York University Stern School of Business, Volatility 
Institute. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. (2001). Working Paper on Pillar 3 - Market 
Discipline. Bank for International Settlements. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. (2009). Revisions to the Basel II market risk 
framework. Bank of International Settlement. 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. (2015). Dodd-Frank Act Stress Test 
2015: Supervisory Stress Test Methodology and Results. Federal Reserve System. 
Chumo, L. (2011). The Basel Capital Framework: From Basel I to Basel III. Global 
Association of Risk Professionals. 
Covas, F. B., Rump, B., & Egon, Z. (2013). Stress-Testing U.S. Bank Holding 
Companies: A Dynamic Panel Quantile Regression Approach. Federal Reserve Board. 
Dietrich, A., Hess, K., & Wanzenried, G. (2014). The good and bad news about the new 
liquidity rules of Basel III in Western European countries. Journal of Banking & Finance, 13-25. 
Farm Credit Administration. (2017). Spring 2017 Regulatory Project Plan .  




Farm Credit Administration. (2014, September 22). History of FCA and the FCS. 
Retrieved from Farm Credit Administration: 
https://www.fca.gov/about/history/historyFCA_FCS.html 
Farm Credit Administration. (2016, january 11). FCS Directory and Map. Retrieved from 
Farm Credit Administration: https://www.fca.gov/info/directory.html 
Farm Credit Administration. (2016, March 10). Fact Sheet on Tier 1/Tier 2 Regulatory 
Capital Framework Final Rulemaking. FCA. Retrieved from Farm Credit Administration: 
http://www.fca.gov/Download/NewsReleaseFactSheets/FactSheetProposedCapitalRule.pdf 
Farm Credit Administration. (2018). About FCA. Retrieved from Farm Credit 
Administration: http://fca.gov/about/index.html 
Farm Credit Illinois. (2005). Retrieved from Farm Credit Illinois Annual Report : 
http://www.farmcreditil.com/Financials/Annual-04.pdf  
Farm Credit System Insurance Corporation. (2015, June 30). General Information. 
Retrieved from Farm Credit System Insurance Corporation: 
https://www.fcsic.gov/General%20Information.html 
Federal Farm Credit Banks. (2016). Funding Corporation Data Center. Retrieved from 
Funding Cost Index: https://www.farmcreditfunding.com/ffcb_live/fundingCostIndex.html 
Federal Reserve System. (2013). Policy Statement on the Scenario on the Design 
Framework for Stress Testing. Retrieved from Federal Reserve: 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/bcreg20121115a4.pdf 
Fenderal Reserve of Economic Data. (2016). Economic Research. Retrieved from 




González, F. (2005). Bank regulation and risk-taking incentives: An international 
comparison of bank risk. Journal of Banking & Finance, 1153-1184. 
Guerrieri, L., & Welch, M. (2012). Can Macro Variables Used in Stress Testing Forecast 
the Performance of Banks? Federal Reserve Board. 
Hirtle, B., Kovner, A., Vickery, J. I., & Bhanot, M. (2015). Assessing Financial Stability: 
The Capital and Loss Assessment under Stress Scenarios (CLASS) Model. FRB of New York 
Staff Report. 
Huntington, D. S., & Weiss, P. R. (2010). Summary of Dodd-Frank Financial Regulation 
Legislation. Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governace and Financial Regulation. 
Jerome Stam, D. M. (2002). United States Department of Agriculture Agricultural 
Income and Finance Annual Lender Isuue. Retrieved from Electronic Outlook Report from the 
Economic Research Service: http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/usda/ers/AIS/2000s/2002/AIS-02-
26-2002.pdf 
Kapinos, P. S., & Mitnik, O. A. (2015). A Top-Down Approach to Stress-testing Banks. 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 
Kiema, I., & Jokivuolle, E. (1012). Does a leverage ratio requirement increase bank 
stability? Journal of Banking & Finance, 240-254. 
King, M. R. (2013). The Basel III Net Stable Funding Ratio and bank net interest 
margins. Journal of Banking & Finance, 4144-4156. 
Moore, J. (2011). Farm Credit System Condition Update. Denver: National Agricultural 
Credit Committie. 
Sorge, M. (2004). Stress-testing financial systems: an overview of current methodologies. 




TIAA Center of Farmland Research. (2016). Tools and Data. Retrieved from TIAA 
Center of Farmland Research: http://farmland.illinois.edu/content/tools-and-data 
VanHoose, D. (2007). Theories of bank behavior under capital regulation. Journal of 
Banking & Finance, 3680-3697. 
Vazquez, F., & Federico, P. (2015). Bank funding structures and risk: Evidence from the 
global financial. Journal of Banking & Finance, 1-14. 
 
 
 
